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1. Introduction  
 
This report provides a general overview of the main aspects concerning the subject “flexibility 
of retirement” and describes the current situation, and likely future developments, of flexible 
retirement provisions within selected European Member States, based on a review of selected 
published works. 
The report is organised as follows. Section 1 introduces the topic and the appropriate 
framework. Section 2 provides information on the key steps and the current normative framework 
concerning both flexibility in the retirement age and the possibility of partial retirement. Section 3 
contains a short description of the elements of evaluation of the reforms introducing or 
enhancing flexibility, with a focus on reforms which introduced the NDC system, as in Italy, 
Sweden and Latvia. Finally, the appendix provides quantitative information on the sources of 
income of older people and their employment status, both disaggregated by a number of relevant 
dimensions.  
 
Looking for a definition. The starting point in sketching a conceptual framework for an analysis 
of flexibility of retirement is to find a definition accommodating both flexible and partial (gradual) 
retirement. Apart from the very broad definitions given by the International Labour 
Organization1, a commonly accepted one does not seem to be available. This state of the art 
reflects a long standing tradition of public intervention in the definition of the retirement 
procedure. Indeed, the expression of “legal retirement age” – quite common in Europe – testifies 
the limited discretionary choice that workers can exert in this area. Consequently, at an empirical 
level, both flexible and partial/gradual retirement can only be defined in relative terms.  
Moreover, while in principle it should be just appropriate to consider flexibility both in the age 
of retirement and in the way the accumulated pension wealth is drawn down (partial/gradual 
retirement) as two faces of the same medal, the European perspective testifies of two different 
circumstances, differently motivated and thus normally differently legislated. This is why, in this 
report, we propose and use relative definitions of a flexible pension system, based on “legal 
definitions”, which are generally country specific.  
  
Desirability and Effectiveness of flexible retirement. Although flexibility can, in general, be considered 
a good feature of a pension system, it is certainly not an absolute value. In general, flexibility is 
introduced as a means to grant workers some degree of choice with respect to an important 
aspect of  their life, but also as an instrument to achieve an increase in the average retirement age, 
in order to improve the financial sustainability of present PAYG systems.   
All features of a flexible pension system have implications for individuals – in terms of both 
adequacy and fairness – as well as consequences for the financial sustainability of the system. As 
for the latter, the introduction, in combination with some degree of flexibility in retirement age, 
of an actuarially fair method of calculating benefits can be seen as a safeguard against the 
financial stress caused by the possibility of “too young” retirement ages.  On the other hand, 
adequacy concerns can arise in case retirement at the “minimum” possible age should leave 
individuals with unacceptably low benefits. In relation to this issue, the importance of an 
“appropriate” minimum retirement age – the lower bound of the retirement window – is often 
underlined in the literature (a comprehensive discussion of this and other “optimal retirement 
rules” is provided in Diamond, 2005). 
                                                 
1 The ILO report (2005) refers to “the option given to retirees to choose the age at which they retire (usually within 
certain limits)” for flexible retirement and to “combining of part time employment with receipt of a reduced 
pension” for partial retirement.  
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Moreover, the definition of unique mortality rates across individuals with different working 
histories and different life expectancies poses equity problems. For instance Brown (2000) 
discusses how to incorporate into the pension formulae the heterogeneity in mortality probabilities 
as well as the evolution of mortality rates over time and cohorts.  
 
Benchmarking. Although flexibility in the choice of the age of retirement is sometimes 
introduced in defined benefit schemes, as we will see in the next sections it typically characterizes 
(Notional) Defined Contribution ones (Palmer, 1999). As of 2006, in the enlarged Europe, Italy, 
Latvia, Poland and Sweden have adopted a Notional Defined Contribution formula (NDC).  
The flexibility in the choice of the retirement age is thus generally coupled with an actuarial 
correction in the pension benefit. Therefore, particular attention is paid in the literature to the 
characteristics of actuarial fairness and actuarial neutrality of NDC pension systems, as well as to 
the definition of a benchmark for their actuarial features (see Disney, 1999 for a discussion and 
an evaluation of the features of these systems).  
However flexible, a system has to be characterised by a minimum and (usually) also a 
maximum age of exit from the labour market, or, if an upper bound is missing, by at least an age 
above which permanence on the job is discouraged. Workers can typically retire at any age within 
this ‘window’. The key element to consider between these two age limits is the accrual rate (see 
Section 3.3). This determines the pension benefits and whether workers are encouraged or not to 
a longer permanence in the labor market. When the accrual rate is more than actuarially neutral, 
workers retiring at the low ages of the retirement window are penalized, whereas those choosing 
to retire at the upper end receive a more than actuarially neutral benefit; vice versa, in the case of 
accrual rates, less than actuarially neutral.  
 
Flexibility in retirement and work of the elderly. Among the issues related to the reforms introducing 
elements of flexibility, particular attention deserve the participation rates of older workers. Many 
empirical studies agree on the quite low efficiency of the reforms on the average retirement age 
(see e.g. Brugiavini and Peracchi, 2004, for an application to the Italian pension system). As for 
the impact of the payroll tax rate on employment, Disney (2004) shows the different impact of its 
tax component and saving component, concluding that the first reduces economic activity rates 
among women while the second has the opposite effect. The economic activity rates of men, 
however, are little affected by the composition of payroll tax rates.  
In comparing these reforms with those introducing mandatory provisions, however, the 
welfare-improving capabilities of pension schemes which do not distort individual choices is to 
be taken into account  (Disney, 2004).  
Concerning gradual retirement, the evaluation of its effects on labor supply is the main topic 
of discussion. The possibility of partial or gradual exit from the labor force can be allowed in the 
years before or after the ‘normal’ retirement age. This is an important factor in determining the 
likely impact on participation rates of older workers, as only in the second case it has the clear 
aim of extending individual working careers. In most of the European countries adopting it, 
however, partial pension is not possible after the standard retirement age; in these cases its main 
objective is reducing the number of workers resorting to full early retirement and cutting in this 
way social security expenses.  
Unfortunately, most of the literature on partial retirement is relative to the United States, as 
partial retirement schemes in Europe are only chosen by a very small fraction of workers, 
possibly because this choice is not adequately encouraged.  
The objective of increasing the activity rate of older workers can be hindered by legal and 
institutional obstacles to its take up, e.g. the fact that pension benefits may be determined by 
earnings in the final years of the career (Casey, 1998; European Commission, 2004). On the 
whole, phased retirement does not appear to be associated with early exit from the workforce and 
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it may indeed extend the workers’ careers (Chen and Scott, 2006, based on the HRS; Wadensjö, 
2005).  
On the labour demand side, the most important issues concern the negotiation of short-term 
part-time contracts to allow for a partial withdrawal from work of older workers, considering the 
evolution of their productivity with age (Lumsdaine and Mitchell, 1999; OECD, 1998).  
 
 
2. Country analyses 
 
2.1 Reforms introducing flexibility in the choice of retirement age 
During the last decade different reforms have been introduced in many European countries 
with the aim of improving flexibility in retirement age. The rules of each country differ from one 
another with respect to several aspects, such as the provision of – actuarially neutral or not – 
correction mechanisms of the pension amount drawn at different ages; the provision of eligibility 
requirements based on insurance seniority; the existence and the effectiveness of specific 
incentives/disincentives to earlier or later retirement, and so on.  
After a brief overview on the main features of the pension schemes in each country, the 
county-specific analyses will focus on the recent reform process as well as the existing rules 
concerning flexibility in retirement age and highlight the main features that characterize each 
national pension system. 
The countries described in this and in the following sections are grouped according to a 
classification by typologies of pension systems (Soede et. al., 2004) where Sweden, Finland and 
Denmark represent the Nordic countries, France and Germany the continental ones; Italy and 
Spain stand for Mediterranean countries and the UK for the Anglo-Saxons; the Netherlands are, 
as usual, classified as a hybrid country, and, finally, Latvia and Poland represent Eastern 
European ones.  
 
Sweden 
The current structure of the Swedish pension system comes from a reform – approved in 
1999 but in force since 2003 – that radically modified the former rules, by changing the previous 
PAYG defined benefits pension scheme into a notional defined contribution one. The new 
system is composed by a minimum guaranteed pension and an earnings-related one, that in turn 
consists of a NDC component and a defined-contribution pre-funded one. The amount of 
benefits has also changed: while according to the pre-reform rules benefits were based on the 15 
years of work with the highest earnings out of the minimum 30 of work, under the new scheme 
they are actuarially neutral, so they depend on the whole lifetime contributions, on the number of 
years worked and on life expectancy at the moment of retirement. 
In accordance with the principle of actuarial neutrality, the 1999 reform also modified the 
existing rules about retirement age. Until that date the statutory retirement age was fixed at 65 
years, but pension benefits could be drawn from age 61 –  with a reduction in the amount – up to 
the age of 70 –  with a lifelong increase. In particular, the pension was decreased by 0.5 per cent – 
up to a maximum reduction of 24 per cent – for each month of withdrawal between 61 and 65; 
on the other hand, the amount of benefits was increased by 0.7 per cent – up to a maximum rise 
of 42 per cent – for each month of deferment up to the age of 70 (OECD, 2003b). Similarly, the 
post-reform Swedish pension system is characterized by great flexibility: retirement can begin 
between the ages of 61 and 67, and in addition people can work thereafter with the employer’s 
consent (European Commission, 2006a; OECD, 2003b; Swedish National Social Insurance 
Board, 2003). 
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Denmark 
Denmark has a three-pillar pension system. The first pillar consists of two tiers: a flat-rate 
PAYG social pension (folkepension) and a labour market supplementary pension (ATP).  
The folkepension is a universal PAYG scheme, where the only eligibility requirement is Danish 
citizenship and the amount of benefit is proportional to the length of residence in the country (40 
years of residence in order to obtain the full pension). This pension is income-tested: people who 
have an additional income source (e.g. labour income) that exceeds an established threshold will 
undergo a reduction in the pension benefit by 30 per cent of that additional income.  
The second tier of the first pillar – the supplementary pension, ATP – involves people in paid 
employments2. Benefits are based on the duration of the membership in the scheme and on the 
amount of contributions paid, that does not depend on labour earnings but on the number of 
hours worked.  
The second pillar consists mainly of occupational schemes and the third of individual savings 
schemes (Bingley et al., 2005; Bingley et al., 2002; EIRO, 2005; Herbertsson et al., 2000 and 
OECD, 2005d).  
Relating to the age of retirement, a reform approved in 1999 – effective since July 1st, 2004 – 
reduced the retirement age from 67 to 65 for people born after the 1st July 1939. This cut seems 
almost paradoxical in a moment in which most European countries are rising their retirement 
age. Yet, this reform was motivated by the aim of increasing a low effective average retirement 
age. As a matter of fact, the 1999 reform along with reducing the retirement age restricted the 
access to the generous early retirement payments.  
A new reform is being gradually introduced with the aim to reintroduce the  67-year 
requirement (both in old age and early retirement schemes). 
The current legislation sets up the minimum retirement age at 65 years without any possibility 
of early retirement3 but allows for deferment with an actuarial adjustment of benefits up to the 
age of 70. Similarly, the ATP pension increases by a fixed percentage for each month of 
deferment (European Commission, 2006a).  
 
Finland 
The Finnish public old-age pension system consists of two main parts: an earnings-related 
component that covers all economically active workers – self-employed, employees and farmers – 
and a national pension that guarantees to all residents a minimum pension, that is earnings-tested 
with respect to the earnings-related pension. The former scheme – that provides a defined 
benefit pension – is partly funded and partly financed by a pay-as-you-go mechanism; the amount 
of pension benefits is related to the whole lifetime earnings.  
The latest main reform of the Finnish pension scheme was legislated in 2001-2002 and took 
effect in 2005. Its goals were not only to guarantee sustainability and equity to the system, but 
also to increase the participation of the elderly in the labour market and make retirement rules 
more transparent and actuarial. Its focused on the reform of the earnings-related pension 
scheme, while leaving the national pension essentially unchanged: the normal retirement age 
remained 65 years, without possibility of partial retirement and rules about early retirement 
remain almost the same4. 
As for the earnings-related scheme, before 2005 the normal retirement age was fixed at 65 but 
the possibility of early retirement was available for private sector employees aged between 60 and 
64. In case of early retirement, the amount of the pension was reduced by 0.4 percentage points 
                                                 
2 People that worked more than 9 hours per week.  
3 A way to retire earlier than 65 years is the Voluntary Early Retirement Pay – VERP. It entitles members of an 
unemployment insurance fund to retire – under some eligibility conditions – between 60 and 64 years and receive a 
state pension computed as a share of the unemployment benefits (European Commission, 2003 and OECD, 2005d). 
4 For this reason the description of Finnish pension reform will be mainly focused on the earnings-related scheme. 
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for each month of early withdrawal. On the other hand, deferred retirement was also possible, 
with a benefit increase of 0.6 per cent for each month of postponement, but without additional 
pension rights accruing from the extended career. In order to compute the amount of pension 
benefits,  pensionable earnings (indexed to today’s level) were multiplied by an age-dependent 
accrual rate. This was quite flat: 1.5 percentage points per year for earnings until the age of 59 and 
2.5 percentage points for earnings between 60 and 65 years (Lassila and Valkonen, 2006).  
Generally, incentives to work longer – in term of replacement rates – are low in Finland: a 
deferment by 7 years – from 63 to 70 – causes an increase of the replacement rate by only 5 
percentage points (OECD, 2004c). 
The 2005 reform changed the rules about retirement age by introducing a “window” of 
flexible retirement between ages 63 and 68 and the possibility of early retirement at the age of 62. 
Within the window of flexible age incentives to later retirement are given by higher accrual rates 
and, with regard to deferred retirement, by actuarial adjustments. In particular the reform 
established the values for the accrual rates at 1.5 per cent until the age of 52, 1.9 per cent between 
the ages of 53 and 62 and 4.55 per cent from the age of 63 onwards. During the period (12 
months) in which early retirement is still possible, the earnings-related pension is reduced by 0.6 
percent for each month. The Finnish pension system also allows for unlimited deferment: when 
people retire after the retirement window an actuarial adjustment of 0.4 per cent per months (4.8 
per cent per year) is applied (European Commission, 2006a and Lassila and Valkonen, 2006). 
 
Spain 
The Spanish public pension system consists of a compulsory pay-as-you-go scheme and a 
non-contributory one, that provides flat-rate benefits to persons over age 65 or disabled who are 
not entitled to a contributory pension. In the first component, pension benefits are earnings-
related and depend on the number of years of contribution. The normal retirement age in Spain 
is 65, with a minimum seniority requirement of 15 years, becoming 35 in order to receive a full 
pension.  
The major recent reform process in Spain occurred in 2002, when a new “flexible retirement” 
system came into force with the aim of extending the working life of older people. The 
introduction of this scheme was one of the results of a process which started in 1996 with the 
implementation of the “Toledo Pact” (1995). Among other things, this process brought to an 
agreement in April 2001 between government, employers’ representatives and trade unions, that 
came into force on January 1st 2002. 
With regard to retirement age,  the 2002 law introduced some measures of flexibility. Even if 
the normal retirement age is set at 65, there is the possibility to retire earlier. In particular, 
workers who started contributing before 1967 can retire from the age of 60 as well as those who 
have contributed for at least 30 years and have been unemployed for at least 6 months for 
reasons outside their control can retire from the age of 61. In both these cases early retirement is 
penalized by a reduction rate for each year before 65.  
Moreover, the Spanish pension system provides an incentive to retire later for those working 
over the age of 65, provided they have 35 years of insurance seniority. An additional incentive to 
lengthen one’s working life is the exemption from paying social security contributions for 
employees older than 65 and their employers, as well as for the self-employed (European 
Commission, 2006a; OECD, 2003a and Spanish Minister of Labour, 2006). 
 
Italy 
Since 1992 the Italian pension system has undergone a series of major changes directed at 
correcting its main structural problems: a systematic insufficiency of contributions to cover 
outlays, a strong redistribution and relatively young effective retirement ages, induced by 
                                                 
5 It is 1.5 per cent if the worker withdraws the old age pension. 
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generous eligibility requirements. Two major reforms were enacted in 1992 and in 1995, followed 
by other measures in 1997 and 2004.  
Until 1992 the pension formula was a defined benefit one. The amount of pension was based 
on the wage level of the last 5 years for private sector employee, of the last year for public sector 
employees and of the last 10 years for the self-employed. The minimum age for retirement was 
60 years for men and 55 for women, with a working career of at least 15 years6.  
With the 1992 reform the formula remained a DB one, but the link between benefits and 
contribution was strengthened and the eligibility requirements for both old age and seniority 
pensions were increased.  
The 1995 reform changed the previous defined benefit formula into a NDC one. The 
uniformity of treatment was made transparent by the actuarial correspondence between 
contributions and benefits7. The NDC pension was complemented by flexible retirement 
conditions: the law established a minimum and maximum age at which retirement was possible, 
i.e. 57 – 65 years for both men and women; a minimum period of contribution (5 years); the 
condition that accrued pension benefit be at least equal to 1.2 times the social allowance (if the 
test is not met, retirement can only take place at age 65, when at least the social minimum is 
paid); adjustment of the transformation coefficients (i.e. the annuity coefficients to convert the 
contributions at retirement into pension benefits) only up to 65, after which the worker is 
allowed to continue working but the coefficient is no longer increased. Since this reform did not 
immediately come into force, its effects will be postponed after a long transition phase.  
While the 1997 reform anticipated the coming into force of the tighter requirements 
concerning the old-age pensions8, the 2004 one strengthened the eligibility requirements for old-
age pension both during the transition and in the steady-state.  
The 2004 reform increased the minimum requisites for old-age pension. Starting from 2008, 
private employees will be able to retire at 60 years of age9 with 35 years of seniority, or with 40 
years of contributions at any age. In addition, workers whose pension will be entirely computed 
according to the DC method can choose to retire at 65 (men)/60(women) with any seniority.  
Until 2015, women may decide to retire at 57 with 35 years of seniority provided they are 
willing to receive pension benefits computed with the NDC formula.   
The 2004 reform introduced a bonus to incentive retirement deferral for private sector 
employees: up to 31st December 2007 eligible workers who decide to continue working – without 
any increase in contributions – receive a wage increase equal to the amount of the payroll tax, i.e. 
32.7 percent of their gross wage (Fornero and Castellino, 2001; Italian National Social Security 
Institute).  
 
France  
The French pension system is pay-as-you-go, characterized by a great heterogeneity between 
schemes concerning different categories of workers. A reform process in 2003 – the major one in 
the last decade10 – considerably modified the existing rules on retirement, harmonizing the 
                                                 
6 A “seniority pension” also existed; the only eligibility requirement was an insurance seniority of 35 years in the 
private sector and of 20 in the public sector. 
7 Exceptions are motivated by explicit ex ante redistribution in favour of workers with poor and/or more intermittent 
careers. 
8 In particular it established that the requirement of “35 years of contributions and the age of 57 years” should come 
into force in 2002 instead of 2006. 
9 Increasing to 61 from 2010, and 62 from 2014. 
10 A previous reform, which took place in 1993, progressively increased the number of years of contribution required 
to reach full retirement, from 37.5 for cohorts born before 1943 to 40 years for cohorts born after 1943. At the same 
time the rules for computation of  pension benefits increased from 10 to 25 years. Moreover, the 1993 reform 
established that the revaluation of past wages should be based on past prices instead of wages (Aubert, et al., 2005) 
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different pension schemes, in particular those concerning private and public sectors employees11, 
to realign the pension rules with the demographic changes and to encourage a greater flexibility in 
retirement choices. The 2003 law did not change the minimum retirement age, that remains 60 
years12; however, the seniority requirement for full pension eligibility was set at 40 years (160 
quarters)13.  
Within this provision, the main channels introduced by the legislator to allow for a greater 
flexibility in retirement age are the “surcote” and “décote” mechanisms.   
The first one concerns people older than 60 years who satisfy the insurance conditions for a 
full rate pension. They will receive a pension increase by 3 per cent for each supplementary year 
of work (or by 0.75 per cent for each successive quarter).  
On the other hand, the law of 2003 reformed the so called “décote”, that is the possibility of 
retiring between 60 and 65 at a reduced rate, for those who do not fulfil the requirement for a full 
pension. Before 2003 there was a large difference between private and public sector: while private 
sector employees could retire between 60 and 65 but with a very high reduction – 10 percentage 
points for each missing year – for civil servants this possibility did not exist. The 2003 reform set 
up a gradual convergence of these different rules towards a  more actuarially neutral value of the 
décote coefficient of 5 per cent for each missing year for both private and public sector employees 
in 201514 (COR, 2004; European Commission, 2006a and Service Public web page).  
 
Germany 
The core part of the German pension system is the “public retirement insurance” that covers 
private sector employees and public sector employees that are not civil servants, i.e. about 85 per 
cent of the workforce. Starting from the Nineties, various reforms modified the structure of the 
German pension system, determining its gradual evolution from a monolithic pension scheme – 
as it was built up in 1972 – towards a more flexible multi-pillars system. The main reforms 
occurred in 1992, 1999 and 2001. 
Even though before 1992 the normal retirement age was 65 years for men and 60 for women 
and unemployed, numerous early exit ways enabled workers to retire before that age. Both the 
1992 and 1999 reforms tried to simplify the system in order to discourage early exits from the 
workforce.  
The core innovation of the 1992 reform was the introduction of an explicit adjustment factor 
– that nevertheless was not actuarially neutral – for retirement before the normal retirement age, 
i.e. 65 years. According to this reform the amount of the pension benefit was reduced by 0.3 
percentage points (maximum 10.8 per cent) for each month of earlier retirement and increased by 
0.5 per cent for each month of deferment (Berkel and Börsch-Supan, 2003). 
Even though a government change caused the repeal of some of its proposals, the 1999 
reform set up a gradual increase – that should be fully implemented by 2017 – of retirement age 
also for women and unemployed up to 65 years.  
In 2001 the German Government approved the so-called Riester Reform – in force since 
2002 – that turned the German system into a multi-pillar one: the core feature of this reform was, 
indeed, the introduction and development of supplementary funded pensions, individual or 
                                                 
11 This reforms concerns the majority of private and public pension schemes; however it does not concern the 
“Regimes Speciaux de Retraites”, an heterogeneous category that includes some important public firms (SNCF, RATP). 
12 It is however possible for some categories of workers –  for example,  those who started work when they were 
very young, i.e. before the age of 17 – to receive a pension before this standard age.. 
13 The contribution period for retirement at full rate has been increased by 37.5 to 40 years during the period 1994 – 
2003 for private sector employees. With the 2003 reform it will increase to 40 years also for public sector employees 
in 2008. It will still increase up to 42 years for both private and public sector in 2012 (Benallah et al., 2003). 
14 For private sector employees the target value of 5 per cent will be achieved in 2013; for a more detailed description 
of the gradual process of alignment see COR (2004).  
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occupational, to fill the gap created by the reduction of replacement rates (Börsch-Supan and 
Wilke, 2004).  
However, the financial disequilibrium of the pension system stressed the need for a further 
reform. In 2003 a Commission (called “Rürup Commission”) was created with the aim of 
elaborating a reform proposal. Many of the Commission’s suggestions became law: among them, 
one of the main changes was the introduction – in 2004 – of the “sustainability factor” 
(depending on the dependency ratio) into the benefit indexation formula. On the contrary, the 
proposal of increasing retirement age from 65 to 67 did not become law. Recently, it has been 
planned to increase the eligibility age for state pension from 65 to 67 between 2012 and 2029 
(Börsch-Supan and Wilke, 2006, European Commission, 2006c and Hinrichs, 2003).  
The current legislation fixes normal retirement age at 65. The possibility of early retirement – 
even if subject to some seniority requirements – is available to some categories of workers, i.e. 
women, unemployed and disabled, after the age of 60. In this case the amount of lifelong benefits 
is reduced by 0.3 per cent for each month of anticipated retirement. On the other hand unlimited 
deferment of retirement is possible with an increase of benefits of 0.5 per cent for each month of 
postponement.  
 
United Kingdom 
The British social security system is composed of a public pension scheme made by a 
contributory flat-rate Basic State Pension and an earnings-related component called State Second 
Pension. The latter substituted the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) in 2002, 
introducing  more redistributive features.  
The State Pension Age is now fixed at 65 for men and 60 for women, but women’s retirement 
age will gradually increase between 2010 and 2020 up to men’s State Pension Age. In order to be 
entitled to a full rate pension men must have contributed to National Insurance for 44 years and 
women for 39 years, progressively increasing to 44 between 2010 and 2020. 
Since 1989 it has been possible to receive a State Pension and continue working without any 
financial penalty. Moreover, pension benefits payment can be deferred: until 2005 both Basic 
State Pension and State Second Pension could be deferred up to the age of 70, with an increase 
of the pension benefit by 1 per cent for each 7 weeks of deferment. Starting from April 2005, the 
pension increases by 1 per cent for each 5 weeks of deferment with the possibility of unlimited 
deferment15. Moreover, workers who postpone retirement for at least 12 months can choose to 
get the deferred benefit as a lump-sum rather than as an increase in future pension payments; the 
deferred benefit accrues interests at 2 per cent above the Bank of England Base Interest Rate 
(Cooper, 2002; Euopean Commission, 2006a; OECD 2004b; PPI, 2006).  
United Kingdom’s legislation does not provide any form of partial retirement, even if it is 
planned to introduce the possibility of cumulating labour income and occupational pension 
(OECD, 2006a). 
A high degree of flexibility in the retirement age is possible in private third-pillar pensions, 
such as Personal pensions and Stakeholder pensions. Concerning the first, benefits may consist 
of an annuity or income withdrawal. A person can buy an annuity between her 60th and 75th 
birthday. From 2010, the starting age to buy annuities will gradually increase to 65 in line with the 
increase of women’s State Pension age. Similarly, income can be withdrawn from the fund 
between the 60th (gradually rising to 65th from 2010 to 2020) and 75th birthday.  
Stakeholder pensions are flexible and can be easily transferred, with a limit on the 
management costs that can be charged each year. These are paid through an annuity, that can be 
bought between the 50th (55th from 2010) and 75th  birthday, using the money contributed into 
the pension fund.  
                                                 
15 Worker must postpone both Basic State Pension and State Second Pension: it is not possible to defer only one of 
them. 
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The Netherlands 
The first pillar of the Dutch pension system is a pay-as-you-go flat-rate pension (AOW) paid 
to all residents from the age of 65, regardless of withdrawal from the labour force. It is not 
means-tested and does not depend on earned income or contributions but on household 
composition and on the length of residence in the country: a couple aged 65 or older receives an 
amount equal to the minimum net wage (e.g. 55 per cent of the average wage), while a pensioner 
living alone draws 70 per cent of that amount. The condition for eligibility to a full pension is 50 
years of insurance (residence) between 15 and 65; for each year without insurance 2 per cent is 
deducted from the full pension. The pension age is fixed at 65, even if there is an open public 
debate about increasing it up to 67 or establishing  a window of flexible retirement age. 
A greater level of flexibility in retirement age is provided by occupational pension schemes 
(second pillar). In general, almost all (96 per cent, OECD, 2005a) the Dutch occupational 
pension schemes are defined benefit and most of them have the aim of providing, together with 
the AOW pension, a replacement rate of 70 per cent for 40 years of contributions.  
The age at which occupational pensions can be drawn is generally 65. In the early 1990s, the 
Dutch government and social partners (trade unions and employer organisations) recognised the 
adverse incentive effects of the prevailing early retirement schemes. They decided to transform 
the PAYG schemes into less generous and actuarially fair pre-funded schemes. The starting dates 
and the implementation period of the transitional arrangements varied by industry sector. In 
general, under the new schemes employees have the possibility to retire at a much younger ages, 
but the actuarial neutrality should not discourage labour participation (Euwals et al., 2006; van de 
Ven, 2001). 
Occupational pension schemes allow to continue working after the age of 65, but without any 
increase in pension entitlements. Like the AOW pension, occupational pensions can be 
combined with labour income without any limitation. Moreover, some of these schemes allow 
workers at the end of their career to reduce their working hours and receive a partial pension. 
 
Poland 
During the period of centrally planned economy the Polish pension system substantially 
balanced. A pension debt under control and an effective retirement age close to the legal one 
made pension benefit close to actuarial neutrality. In 1991, however, the shift to the free market 
made changes necessary. The so-called Revaluation Act changed the rules of calculation of 
pensions by strengthening the link between contributions and benefits and by  increasing the 
value of the pension in order to compensate for high inflation16.  
The increasing deficit that followed the 1991 reform opened a public debate – that became 
more intense during the second half of the Nineties – on the possible options in reforming Polish 
pension system. The debate brought to the approval, in 1998, of the reform plan “Security 
through Diversity”. This reform, that came into force on 1st January 1999, only involved the 
insured workers who were younger than 50 when the reform came into force, i.e. those born 
after 31 December 1948. This reform changed the old defined benefit pension system into a 
notional defined contribution scheme, that tightened the link between paid contribution and 
pension benefits. Indeed, the amount of the new pension depends on the indexed pension 
contributions paid after 1st January 1999 and, as far as the insured of the old system are 
concerned, on the so-called “indexed initial capital: for each person insured with the old scheme 
a hypothetical pension – corresponding to what she would have received on 1st January 1999 – 
has been calculated; that hypothetical pension is multiplied by the average life expectancy of 
women and men aged 62 and gives the value of the initial capital. Then the pension amount is 
                                                 
16 This reform also modified some other aspect of the previous legislation: for example, it restricted the possibility of 
combining pension and labour earnings, introduced new indexation principles and a minimum level of benefit 
guarantee. 
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computed by dividing the sum of initial capital and contributions paid within the new pension 
scheme by the average life expectancy at retirement.  
The Polish pension scheme does not fix a normal retirement age but only the minimum one, 
that is 60 years for women and 65 years for men17, without any possibility of early retirement. No 
requirement of insurance seniority is necessary to receive the old-age pension; however, the 
strong link between paid contributions and earned benefits is an incentive to work longer and 
postpone retirement in order to obtain higher benefits (Chlon-Dominczak and Góra, 2006; Góra 
and Rutkowski, 2000; Perek Bialas et al., 2001; ZUS, 2004). 
 
Latvia 
The main process reforming the Latvian pension system – after the independence in 1991 – 
started in 1994: after the request of help by the Latvian Government to the World Bank, a 
Swedish and Latvian team of experts was formed with the aim of developing a new pension 
system. This effort resulted in 1995 in a reform – taking effect in January 1996 – that radically 
changed the previous rules, providing Latvia with a multilevel pension system, where the first tier 
is a PAYG system with a strong link between pension benefits and contribution, in line with the 
NDC rules.  
The minimum retirement age has been gradually augmented to 60 for both men and women18. 
At the same time some degree of flexibility was introduced. The pension calculation formula 
encourages the postponement of retirement while early retirement – with an actuarially reduced 
pension – was possible only for women with a seniority higher than 10 years (Bite, 2003; Casey, 
2004 and Fox and Palmer 1999). 
In 1999 another reform of retirement rules came into force. It established a further increase in 
minimum retirement age to 62 years for both men and women19: for men the age increased by 6 
months each year starting from 2000 and so the target of 62 has already been achieved in 2003, 
while for women it increased by one year in 1996 and by 6 months each following year so that 
the minimum retirement age for women will become 62 only in 2008 (it is 61 in 2006) (Latvian 
Ministry of Welfare, 2006; National report, 2005 and Vanovska, 2006).  
The same reforming act extended the right to early retirement to men, so that, up to July 2008, 
people can retire up to 2 years early. The pension benefit in this case is actuarially diminished and 
it is reduced by 20 percentage point up to the statutory retirement age.  
The Latvian pension system does not allow for any provision of partial retirement, while only 
the possibility of combining work with (full) pension is admitted, provided that the amount of 
pension does not exceed an established threshold based on the state social security benefit . In 
this case the worker continues to pay contributions and accumulates additional pension wealth. 
Pensions can be recalculated every 3 years in order to take into account these extra contributions 
(Vanovska, 2006). 
 
 
2.2 Reforms introducing flexibility in partial retirement 
Along with flexible retirement age, the main instrument used to guarantee flexibility of the 
pension system is partial / gradual retirement. The first country that introduced this possibility in 
its regulations was Sweden – in 1976. This experience has been followed by other European 
countries and currently is an important matter of debate in many others.  
                                                 
17 The proposal of setting a minimum retirement age at the same level for men and women (62 years) was already 
advanced in 1998, but it did not get political approval. At present the question of whether to increase the minimum 
retirement age for women at 65 years is object of an open debate. 
18 Before 1994 retirement age was 60 for men and 55 for women. 
19 A minimum contribution of 10 years is also required. 
 12
This section describes the main features of partial retirement and the gradual exit paths from 
labour market available to workers in Sweden, Spain, Denmark, Finland, France and Germany. 
The other countries object of this report do not allow for partial retirement. 
 
Sweden 
As already said, Sweden has been one of the first countries to introduce – in 1976 – a partial 
pension (delpension) scheme, allowing wage earners to work part-time before full retirement while 
receiving a fraction of old-age pension. The purpose of the Swedish legislator was to improve the 
flexibility of the pension system, by providing an incentive to a smoother transition from work to 
retirement and by easing the working conditions during the last years of work.  
Workers aged between 60 and 64 (the normal retirement age was 65) received a pension 
equivalent to 65 per cent of lost income, up to a certain limit. The minimum reduction of 
working time was set at 5 hours per week and the remaining working time had to be at least 17 
hours. In addition, workers must have had pensionable earnings for at least 10 years after the age 
of 45 and have been employed for at least 5 out of the last 12 months (Ginsburg, 1985).  
During the Eighties two reforms changed the replacement rate of partial pension with respect 
to earnings loss: in 1981 they were reduced to 50 per cent and in 1987 raised to 65. 
In the context of the Swedish economic crisis of the Nineties, the government decided to cut 
the welfare expenditure and reformed in 1994 the partial retirement scheme so as to make it less 
generous. The age limit for eligibility was risen from 60 to 61, the upper limit of reduction of 
working hours was fixed at 10 and the replacement rate of lost earnings was reduced to 55 per 
cent.  
Since the provision of partial pensions was considered too expensive in a system that already 
offered great flexibility in terms of options to combine work and retirement, in 2001 the gradual 
retirement was abolished.  
As a result of a collective agreement, however, a partial retirement scheme has been 
reintroduced on 1st January 2003. It entitles workers older than 61 (and also beyond the age of 
67) to reduce their working hours by as much as one half. Current legislation allows workers to 
choose whether to withdraw the full amount, three-quarters, half or one-quarter of the monthly 
pension. The percentage of the pension can be increased at any time but it can be cut only every 
6 months (Anderson, 2005; Wadensjö, 2005). 
 
Denmark 
A partial pension (delpension) scheme was introduced for the first time in the Danish pension 
system in 1987. This scheme entitled workers aged between 60 and 66 to gradual retirement 
before becoming full-time pensioners. Before the statutory retirement age (67) they could reduce 
their working time to a part-time job and, at the same time, receive a partial public pension.  
The partial pension scheme is currently regulated by the Partial Pension Act (Lov om 
Delpension) that regards both employees and self-employed. In order to be eligible for partial 
retirement workers must be aged between 60 and 6520, must be Danish citizens and reduce their 
working hours by at least 7 hours or at least one quarter of the average weekly hours, with the 
remaining number of hours between 12 and 30 per week. Moreover, employees must have 
participated to the supplementary pension scheme (ATP) for at least 10 out of the last 20 years 
and must have worked 18 out of the last 24 months in Denmark. Similarly, self-employed must 
have worked full-time during the past 5 years, must have been self-employed in Denmark for at 
least 4 out of the last 5 years and must have been self-employed for at least 9 months in the past 
year. In addition, they must have made some profit in their activity and must reduce their 
working hours to 18.5 per week on average.  
                                                 
20 67 for those who reached the age of 60 before 1st July 1999. 
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The amount of the partial pension paid is proportional to the reduction of the working time 
and is calculated according to the “basic amount” (grund-beløb), equivalent to 82 per cent of the 
maximum annual amount of the unemployment benefits21.  
Precisely, partial pension pays to employees 1/37 of the basic amount for each hour by which 
the weekly working time is reduced. Instead, the self-employed receive a partial pension 
corresponding to 18.5 working hours per week on average, equivalent to DKK 68 286 (€ 9 153) 
per year in 2005 (European Commission, 2006a and Ministry of Foreign Affair, 2003). 
 
Finland 
As in the other Nordic countries, Finnish workers have the possibility to apply for partial 
retirement. In this country the part-time pension has been introduced– as a part of a flexible 
retirement system – at the end of Eighties. It became effective in the private sector in 1987 and in 
the public sector in 1989, with different age eligibility conditions. The minimum eligibility age for 
partial retirement was 60 in the private sector and 58 in the public one. However, these 
thresholds have been changing during the Nineties: in 1994 the minimum age became 58 years 
also for private workers and was then progressively reduced– from July 1998 up to December 
2002 – to 56 years, again for both private and public workers. Starting from 2003, the minimum 
eligibility age for partial retirement has been increased again to 58 years (European Commission, 
2003 and Hakola, 2002). 
In summary, at present: to be eligible for a partial pension employees must be aged between 
58 and 67; must substantially reduce their working hours (to 16-28 hours per week); and have to 
reduce their labour income to 35-70 per cent of earlier earnings. The pension amounts to 50 per 
cent of the lost income caused by the decrease in working time22 (European Commission, 2006a; 
Lassila and Valkonen, 2006; Ministry of Finance, 2006; OECD, 2004c). 
 
Spain 
Partial retirement (jubilación parcial) was introduced in Spain in the 1960s. It initially aimed at 
job creation, while only later it became an instrument to increase retirement age.  
In 1984 a “substitution contract” condition was incorporated in partial retirement rules, 
imposing the hiring of an unemployed worker in order to replace the hours not worked by the 
partial retiree. Partial retirement was possible within the 62-64 age window and had to be 
accompanied by a reduction of 50 percent in working hours. 
In 1999 the eligibility criterion was extended to workers aged 60-64 and the reduction in hours 
became more flexible (between 30 – 67 percent). 
The current regulation was established in 2001 and came into force on 1st January 2002. 
Eligibility rules to partial retirement were slightly modified: the age of access increased from 60 to 
61 for the affiliated after 1967, the working time reduction became 25-75% of full-time 
employment with a consequent pension benefit set at 75-25% of the full pension. The main 
innovation was the possibility to receive a partial pension even beyond 65 years of age (jubilación 
flexible) and the abolition of the “substitution contract” beyond that age.  
Moreover, this new rule constitutes a loosening of the prohibition of cumulating pension and 
working income: job prosecution is still prohibited in case of full retirement, but the combination 
of partial pension and part-time work is now possible after the age 65, with the additional 
advantage that the future pension amount increases with the contributions paid after 65 and 
employer’s contributions are no longer required for people working after 65 (OECD, 2003a and 
Spanish Minister of Labour web page). 
 
                                                 
21 Before 1995 the basic amount was 100% during the first 2 ½ years and 80% after (Statistic Denmark web page). 
22 Prior to 1994 the rate applied to earning loss to compute pension benefits was between 44 and 64 per cent, 
increasing with respect to the pensioner’s age.  
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France  
Partial retirement (retraite progressive) has been introduced in the French pension system at the 
end of the Eighties. Since 1988, workers can continue their activity part-time and at the same 
time receive the payment of a fraction of their pension, while accumulating pension rights based 
on their labor income.  
In order to be eligible for partial retirement, workers must satisfy requirements about age, 
insurance duration and type of job: they must be older than 60; have contributed to one or more 
regimes for at least 150 quarters23; have a salaried part-time activity and their working hours must 
be reduced by at least 1/5 of the full working time for that firm.  
The amount of partial pension is paid in different percentages in accordance to the reduction 
of working time. Specifically, 30 per cent of the full pension is paid in case of part-time activity 
between 80 and 60 per cent of full-time employment; 50 per cent of full pension for a part-time 
activity between 60 and 40 per cent and 70 per cent with a part-time activity below 40 per cent of 
full-time employment (Buffeteau and Godefroy, 2005; Caisse Nationale d’Assurance e Veillesse, 
2006; European Commission, 2006a and OECD, 2005c).   
 
Germany 
The German pension system admits the possibility of partial retirement since 1992. The 1992 
reform – following the reunification with Eastern Germany – has been one of the main steps in 
the development of retirement rules in the last 15 years. Its main goals were the simplification 
and the tightening of the rules about early retirement, as well as the introduction of an explicit– 
even if not actuarially neutral – adjustment factor to correct the amount of pension in case of 
advance or postponement of retirement with respect to normal retirement age, i.e. 65 years. 
At present, workers are eligible to partial retirement from the age of 60, in the share of one 
third, one half or two thirds of the full pension with a corresponding cut of the working hours. 
At the same time, the contributions workers pay from their earned wage increase the pension 
they will receive when fully retired. However, only about 4,000 people drew a partial pension in 
recent years, possibly because of another similar scheme that is more attractive to workers and 
employers: since 1996, employees can take old-age part-time work arrangements with their 
employers, receiving a pension while working part-time from the age of 55. One of the attractive 
features of these arrangement is the possibility of working full-time for two and a half years (and 
then do not work for another 2.5 years), instead of working part-time for 5 years (Antolin and 
Scarpetta, 1998; Börsch-Supan, 2000; European Commission 2006a; Mandin, 2003 and OECD 
2005b).  
 
 
3. Evaluation of  reforms  
 
This section is devoted to outline the main elements of evaluation of recent reforms that 
introduced or modified provisions of flexible and/or partial retirement. The main elements of 
evaluation include the effectiveness of the reform and the sustainability and equity of the 
reformed system.  
The effectiveness of the reform in increasing retirement age and labour force participation of 
older workers depends both on the transparency of the formula and on workers’ understanding 
of the mechanism implemented. The sustainability of the system is closely linked to its actuarially 
fairness. However, sustainability should not be achieved at the expenses of equity.  If flexibility is 
based upon actuarial fairness – as it should – equity problems remain open, as the actuarial 
                                                 
23 The requirement is 150 quarters for people born in 1934. This limit gradually increases and becomes 160 quarter 
for people born in 1943 or after. 
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principle cannot itself adequately cope with disadvantaged working conditions and histories (i.e. 
shorter life expectancy connected to certain types of jobs, shorter and more discontinuous 
careers of women, and so on).  
In this section, national reform processes are analyzed from different points of view in order 
to highlight how specific measures can affect labour supply and retirement behaviour. This 
evaluation is focused on a number of specific elements for each country considered.  
The impact of recent reforms on the adequacy of replacement rates and the effective 
retirement age will be considered for France and Germany, whereas the impact on employment 
will be the main issue of interest for Finland. The following analysis will consider both micro and 
macro aspects. In the case of Italy, the analysis takes a macroeconomic perspective, whereas a 
microeconomic approach will be adopted in the analysis carried out in section 3.3.  
 
3.1 Elements of evaluation of flexibility in the choice of retirement age  
France: Replacement Rates and Effective Retirement Age  
As already mentioned in section 2.1, the French pension system underwent two major reforms 
during the last decades, in 1993 and in 2003. The 1993 reform involved only private sector 
employees, whereas the 2003 reform (gradually) extended to public sector employees the main 
rules  of the private sector scheme.  
The evaluation for this country is based on the analyses proposed by Benallah et al. (2003), and 
by Aubert et al. (2005).  
The first study focuses on the adequacy of pension benefits and carries out simulations of the 
gross replacement rates under different legislative frameworks, since both reforms were 
implemented with a period of gradual phasing in. In order to evaluate both the differences and 
the total effect of the reforms, the following case are considered:  the pre-1993 situation, the fully 
phased in 1993 reform and 2003 one.  
Figure 1 shows the gross replacement rates for a representative worker – an employee who 
retires at 60 after at 100 per cent full time employee average wage – in the public and private 
sector, for different durations of working careers and under different legislative scenarios.  
Considering the pre-reforms situation, the replacement rates for private and public sector 
employees were very close – around 75 percent – for an insurance period of at least 37.5 years, 
required to be eligible to a full pension. Instead, pensioners with shorter careers had very 
different replacement rates: in particular, private sector employees were subject to a strong 
reduction in benefits induced by the décote mechanism (10 percentage points subtracted for each 
missing year), while such a mechanism did not exist in the public sector.  
Focusing on the private sector, a parallel shift of the path of replacement rates can be noticed 
after the 1993 reform, mainly due to the increase in the duration of working career necessary to 
be eligible to full pension from 37.5 to 40 years. Moreover, replacement rates substantially 
decreased because of the rise in the number of years considered to compute the reference wage 
(increased from 10 to 25 in 1993).  
The 2003 reform radically changed the mechanism of incentive/disincentive (surcote/décote) for 
deferred or early retirement. In particular, by the time the reform will be fully phased in (2010), 
the décote coefficient for private sector employees will be halved (from 10 to 5 per cent). With 
respect to the post-1993 situation, this change will increase the level of replacement rates for 
people with working careers between 32 and 35 years.  
The 2003 reform also concerned public sector employees, as one of the goals of this law was 
the progressive harmonization of the rules among different categories. The results of this reform 
in terms of replacement rates can be seen again in Figure 1, that shows how the path for civil 
servants noticeably changes after 2003, becoming closer to that of private sector workers. 
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Figure 1-  Pensions before and after reforms in the private and the public sector 
 
 
Source: Benallah, et al. (2003). 
 
Another perspective for the evaluation of the French reforms concerns their effects on labour 
supply and on retirement age. The results of a simulation of the effects of 1993 and 2003 reforms 
on the average effective retirement age are summed up in Tables 1 and 2, respectively (Aubert et 
al., 2005).  
Looking at the first table, two causes of the change in retirement age can be distinguished. The 
first one – implying the rise in retirement age also before the 1993 reform – is the increase in the 
age of entry into the labour force. The second one is the change in the legislative framework, 
whose effects are presented in the last column. The total effects of the reform are stronger with 
respect to the age of birth and amount to a rise of more than 7 months (0.6 years) in retirement 
age of the cohorts born between 1965 and 1974 with respect to the cohort 1935-40.  
 
Table 1 - Impact of 1993 reform on average effective retirement age, private sector employees 
Cohort Before 1993 reform After 1993 reform Average change due to reform 
 Men Women Men Women Men Women 
1935-40 60.4 61.9 60.8 62.1 0.4 0.2 
1940-44 60.4 62.2 60.6 62.5 0.2 0.3 
1945-54 60.5 61.8 60.9 62.2 0.4 0.4 
1955-64 60.7 61.4 61.1 61.9 0.4 0.5 
1965-74 61.2 61.7 61.9 62.2 0.7 0.5 
 
Source: Aubert et al. (2005). 
 
Table 2 shows the impact of the 2003 reform on average retirement age. The considerably 
lower effects of this reform on private sector employees – with respect to 1993 reform – could 
be also due to the cut of the décote coefficient, that implicitly reduces the magnitude of the 
disincentive to earlier retirement. On the other hand, the impact of the last reform on public 
sector workers is notably higher. 
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Table 2 - Impact of 2003 reform on average effective retirement age  
Cohort Before 2003 reform After 2003 reform Average change due to reform 
 Private sector employees 
1945-54 61.5 61.6 0.0 
1955-64 61.5 61.9 0.4 
1965-74 62.1 62.3 0.2 
 Public sector employees 
1945-54 58.6 60.2 1.6 
1955-64 57.9 60.1 2.2 
1965-74 58.6 60.8 2.2 
 
Source: Aubert et al. (2005). 
 
Finland: Employment and Expenditure Sustainability 
As already mentioned (see section 2.1), the Finnish pension system has been radically 
modified in 2005. The 2005 reform concerns various aspects, such as changes in accrual rates, 
longevity adjustment of benefits, and incentives to postpone retirement, i.e. limited eligibility to 
early pension schemes. Lassila and Valkonen (2006) propose a simulation to evaluate the effects 
of the measures introduced by the reform24. The macroeconomic results of the simulation are 
presented in Table 3. We can see that the employment rate will increase by almost 5 percentage 
points in 2050, mostly because of the measures designed to that purpose. As for the sustainability 
of the system, the ratio between pension expenditures and wage bill will decrease by almost 4 
percentage points over the same horizon, as a consequence of the reduction in expenditures and 
of the increase in the wage bill, both in turn due to the increase in retirement age. 
 
Table 3 - Effects of the 2005 Reform: employment rate and expenditures (percentage values) 
 2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
 Employment Rate 
Changes in accrual rates 0.07 0.04 -0.07 -0.14 -0.06 0.06 
Incentives to postpone 
retirement 0.19 1.86 4.66 4.17 4.36 4.67 
Whole Reform 0.26 1.87 4.61 4.07 4.32 4.75 
 Expenditures/wage bill 
Changes in accrual rates 0.0 0.4 1.9 2.4 1.8 1.4 
Incentives to postpone 
retirement -0.8 -1.9 -3.4 -2.4 -2.2 -3.1 
Whole Reform -0.8 -1.7 -2.2 -1.7 -2.6 -3.9 
 
Source: Lassila and Valkonen (2006) 
 
Another study evaluating the impact of 2005 reform (Börsch-Supan, 2005) looks at the 
variation in the net Present Discounted Value (PDV) of pension benefits25, to assess the impact 
on labour force participation among the elderly of the introduction of three measures: a window 
                                                 
24 The simulation is based on an overlapping generation model. The main assumption of the model is that the 2005 
reform postpones retirement. According to the authors, this is a plausible assumption, since the reform rewards 
fiscally longer working careers and make early retirement is less easy (Lassila and Valkonen, 2006).  
25 The PDV sums up all discounted pension benefits after retirement and subtracts discounted contributions paid 
from 55 years up to retirement age. The discount rate is assumed to be 3 per cent. 
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of flexible retirement, a rise in accrual rates at older ages and an increase of the actuarial 
adjustment of early retirement pensions.  
The analysis is based on a simulation model that allows to compute the PDV of net benefits 
for an individual aged 55 before and after the 2005 reform. In order to isolate the impact of the 
three above mentioned measures from the other aspects of the reform, in both frameworks the 
representative worker is assumed to take the unemployment scheme between 55 (57 under the 
new system), then the early old-age retirement pension, and finally the old-age pension. The 
simulation’s results (Figure 2) show a PDV path after the 2005 reform that – after a decreasing 
phase during the unemployment tunnel – starts to increase from the age of 62, when early 
retirement becomes possible, and continues increasing until the age of 63, because of the 
actuarial adjustment. The Finnish pension system provides a window of flexible retirement 
between 63 and 68, during which there is no actuarial adjustment but only a higher accrual26 (4.5 
percent). This higher accrual, however, is not enough to compensate the lack of actuarial 
adjustment: that is the reason of a declining PDV after the age of 63.  
 
Figure 2 - Net Present Discounted Value (PDV) of pension benefits by retirement age 
 
Source: Börsch-Supan (2005). 
 
Under the assumption that individuals measure retirement benefits with PDV – and therefore 
postpone retirement when PDV decreases – the comparison of the two paths of PDV before and 
after the reform allows to understand the impact of the reform on retirement decisions. The 
postponement of the minimum retirement age delays early retirement of 2-3 years as well. On the 
other hand, Figure 2 indicates that the maximum in net PDV is achieved one year earlier than in 
the old system, meaning that people can be expected to retire one year before and suggesting the 
need for a steeper actuarial adjustment within the retirement window. 
 
                                                 
26 Benefits are computed by multiplying pensionable earnings with the accrual rate. In the old system, the accrual rate 
was 1.5 percent p.a. for earnings until age 59, and 2.5 percent for earnings between age 60 and 65. In the new system 
the lower rate will only apply until age 52, and a higher rate of 1.9 percent applies to ages 53 through 62. From age 
63 onwards, the accrual rate increases sharply to 4.5 percent. This means that earnings in later life are valued more 
than earlier earnings. 
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Germany: Effects on Retirement Age  
Before 1992 the German retirement system did not provide any mechanism of adjustment of 
pension benefits to the age of retirement, even though there was a link between benefits and 
contributions. A retirement age adjustment factor was only introduced in 1992, but it was not 
actuarially neutral. 
In order to give a complete picture of the impact of the 1992 reform, its effects should be 
evaluated with respect both to the previous state-of-art and to the benchmark, represented by an 
actuarially neutral scheme. Table 4 shows the adjustment factors in force before 1992, after  the 
1992 reform and the benchmark of actuarially fair values (Börsch-Supan, 2000).  
 
Table 4 - Pension benefits as a percentage of pension benefit at 65 years, by retirement age and different effective 
adjustment factors 
Retirement age  
Adjustment 
factor  60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 
Fair*  66.0 71.5 77.6 84.3 91.7 100 109.2 119.6 131.2 144.4 159.4
Before 1992 87.5 90.0 92.5 95.0 97.5 100 109.9 120.1 123.0 125.8 128.7
Reform 1992 69.5 75.6 81.7 87.8 93.9 100 108.5 117.0 125.5 134.0 142.5
 
* Calculation are made assuming a 3 per cent discount rate. 
Source: Börsch-Supan (2000). 
 
Börsch-Supan (2000) estimates that the effects of the 1992 reform could lead to an increase in 
the effective retirement age by only about six months and reduce the probability of retirement 
before 60 from 32 to 28 percent. On the contrary, an actuarially neutral scheme could shift 
retirement age by about two years. Moreover, the failure to adjust benefits in an actuarially 
neutral way creates a loss in term of Social Security Wealth when a worker decides to defer 
retirement, that can be interpreted as an implicit tax on earnings caused by retirement deferment. 
Even if the 1992 reform remarkably reduced the level of this implicit tax (up to 1992 it was close 
to 50 per cent for retirements between the ages of 60 and 65 and over 66), it was still supposed to 
be  above 20 per cent in the steady state.  
The analysis of the German reforms can be supplemented with the evaluation of the joint 
effects – in terms of actual retirement age and probability to retire before a certain age level – of 
the 1992 and 1999 reforms. The results of Berkel and Börsch-Supan (2003)’s work on the effects 
of the two reforms (when fully implemented, in 2017) are summed up in Table 5, comparing 
simulations of the actual reform and of a hypothetical NDC one.  
According to their results, the average retirement age is expected to increase by almost two 
years, up to 63, when the two reforms will be fully phased in. Furthermore, there is a reduction in 
the probability to retire before the three age thresholds of 60, 62 and 65 years. However, these 
positive effects could be achieved at an even higher extent by the introduction of a NDC scheme, 
as the last line of the table points out: the average retirement age should increase beyond 65 years 
and the probability to retire before 65 should decrease to less than 20 percent. 
 
Table 5 - The impact of 1992 and 1999 reforms and NDC scheme (men only) 
 Mean 
retirement age 
Percentage of 
retired before 60 
Percentage of 
retired before 62 
Percentage of 
retired before 65 
Before 1992 61,2 17.2 % 58.2 % 81.9% 
Pension reforms 
1992 + 1999 63.0 4.7 % 42.4% 51.7% 
NDC System 65.3 2.3% 19.2% 19.4% 
Source: Berkel and Börsch-Supan (2003). 
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Italy: Pension Expenditure  
As already mentioned in section 2.1, the Italian pension system has been radically changed by 
a reform process that began in 1992 with the so-called “Riforma Amato”. In order to evaluate the 
impact of these changes on the sustainability of the system, a macroeconomic analysis is 
developed in this section27, examining the ratio between public expenditure on pensions and 
GDP. 
A forecast of the future path of the ratio between public pension expenditure and GDP is 
offered by the National Report of the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance (Italian Ministry 
of Economics and Finance, 2005) and is represented in Figure 3. This path is determined – along 
with demographic variables – by the changes in the legislation induced by the reforms of the last 
fourteen years. 
The pathway of the ratio between pension public expenditure and GDP between 2006 and 
2015 is heavily influenced by the reduction in pension expenditure resulting by the reform 
approved in 2004 (Berlusconi reform). In particular the reduction between 2008 and 2012 is 
caused by the immediate effect of the tightening of the eligibility conditions. This  effect, 
however, only partially contrasts the demographic transition in 2012-2015, when the ratio slowly 
increases. 
During the following period (2016-2038) that ratio shows an increasing trend, with an 
acceleration after 2025 mainly due to the contemporaneous decrease in the number of workers – 
a consequence of the reduction in the population in working ages – and increase in the number 
of retired – caused both by demographic factors and by the reduction of the impact of the cut in 
expenditure that followed the rise in eligibility conditions.  
The deterioration of demographic factors is only partially compensated by the reduction of 
pension benefits’ dynamics with respect to productivity growth, due to the gradual phasing in of 
the NDC formula.  
The high reduction in the ratio during the last period of this forecast (2039-2050) is mainly 
due to the transition from the “mixed regime”28 to a fully (notional) defined contribution one, 
that causes a considerable reduction of the amount of pension benefits with respect to the old 
regime. Moreover, in the same period the ratio between the number of pensions and number of 
workers is more stable and its growth is expected to be zero in 2046. 
 
Figure 3 - Pension expenditure/ GDP 
 
Source: Italian Ministry of Economics and Finance (2005). 
 
 
                                                 
27 A microeconomic analysis will be developed in section 3.3. 
28 Pension paid under the “mixed regime” are calculated in part with the old DB formula and partly with the new 
NDC one, according to a pro rata temporis mechanism.  
 21
3.2 Elements of evaluation of flexibility in partial retirement 
The main issues to consider in order to evaluate the effects of partial retirement provision on 
labour supply, are whether it encourages people to keep working instead of fully leaving the 
labour market, and whether it subsidizes a reduction in working time of people that otherwise 
would be fully employed. The crucial point is then to see whether partial pensions cause an 
increase or a decrease in the total amount of working hours and if this increase is enough to 
compensate for the costs of the scheme. Therefore, the total effect of partial pensions on labour 
supply can be decomposed into the impact on the number of employed and on the amount of 
working hours of each active individual. 
Even if there is a great and growing interest in partial pensions in many countries, there has 
not been a substantial development of research on this topic. The following analysis will be 
focused on the Swedish and Dutch experiences, in order to point out the effects on labour 
supply and on workers preferences. 
 
Sweden: Effects on Labour Supply  
To evaluate the impact of partial pensions on labour supply – measured by the total amount 
of hours worked in the Swedish economy – a simulation has been proposed by Wadensjö (2005).  
The average weekly working time before and after claiming partial retirement decreases from 
almost 40, for full-time workers not receiving partial pension, to 24 in 1993 and 25 in 2004, for 
workers receiving a partial pension.  
Starting from these data and considering studies on the alternative employment status of 
partial pensioners if the part-time pension system had not existed 29, Wadensjö (2005) estimates 
the impact of partial pensions on Swedish labour supply. Table 6 summarizes these results.  
Looking at the individual labour supply, an increase by more than 4 hours per week can be 
noticed – both in 1991 and in 1994 – with respect to the hypothetical situation where no partial 
pension existed. This net positive effect incorporates the positive effect of working part-time 
instead of being fully retired and the negative one of the reduction in working time with respect 
to full-time employment.  
Moreover, that average value can be decomposed into a smaller effect on male working time – 
by 1-2 hours – and a greater impact on female weekly labour supply by 8-9 hours. The total 
impact on the labour supply of the whole economy is summed up in the last column of Table 6: 
it was close to 6.5 million working hours during 1991 and 10.5 millions in 1994. The difference in 
the magnitude of this impact on total annual worked hours in absolute value is also due to the 
sizeable increase in the number of partial retirees in 1994 with respect to 1991. 
 
Table 6 - Estimated effect on the numbers of working hours worked per person with part-time pension 
 1991 1994 
 Men Women All Men Women All 
Estimated working hours effect per 
week per part-time pensioner 1.39 8.15 4.12 2.22 9.00 4.97 
Total effect in thousands of hours 
during the year 1,310 5,198 6,507 2,758 7,646 10,404
 
Source: Wadensjö (2005). 
 
                                                 
29 Wadensjö (2005) used parameters proposed by Sundén (1994) about the alternative employment status if partial 
retirement had not existed. The assumption is that 56.59 per cent of the male and 42.39 per cent of the female part-
time pensioners would have continued to work the same number of hours (in most times full-time work) before 
withdrawing  the pension and otherwise would not have worked.  
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Another perspective to look at the effects of partial retirement on labour supply is proposed 
in OECD (2003b) and focuses on the relationship between partial pension, employment and 
participation rates. The data shown in Table 7 seem to suggest a negative relationship between 
employment rates or participation rates and the share of people with partial pension. However,  
these data cover a period of high recession and also the participation rate of people aged between 
25 and 54, not directly influenced by partial pension scheme, decreases. Therefore it is difficult to  
conclude from these data that partial pensions has a negative impact on employment.   
 
Table 7 - Partial pensions and work status for person aged 60-64, years 1990-1998 (percentage values) 
Year 
Share of 
people with 
partial pension 
Employment 
rate 
Participation 
rate 
 Participation rate 
(age group 25-54) 
1990 15.3 57.0 58.2  92.8 
1991 14.8 57.6 59.1  92.2 
1992 20.4 54.2 56.4  91.3 
1993 22.1 49.8 53.4  90.3 
1994 24.2 47.2 51.4  89.2 
1995 17.9 47.7 52.4  89.6 
1996 11.8 49.2 54.5  89.4 
1997 6.4 47.3 52.5  88.6 
1998 2.8 46.2 49.7  88.0 
Change in total 
number 1990-94* 
12 505 
(32.8%) 
-51 700 
(-21.2%) 
-3 869 
(-15.6%) 
 18 100 
(0.6%) 
Change in total 
number 1990-98* 
-44 893 
(-88.8%) 
-800 
(-0.4%) 
-3 800 
(-1.8%) 
 -5 500 
(-0.2%) 
 
*Absolute values. 
Source: OECD (2003b). 
 
The Netherlands: Workers’ Preferences for Partial Retirement   
Many of the occupation pension schemes in the Netherlands offer workers the possibility to 
receive a partial pension while reducing their working time. Van Soest et al. (2006) look at data on 
current and former employees’ perception of retirement flexibility at their current or former 
employer and analyze their preferences for early, late and gradual retirement.  
In order to collect data on preferences, that authors asked respondents of the CentERpanel to 
rate how attractive they found hypothetical and simplified retirement paths, with corresponding 
income paths. For instance, the benchmark trajectory is working full-time until 65 and then 
retiring full time with a pension income corresponding to 70% of last earnings; similarly, one of 
the partial retirement paths entails working full-time until 65, then working part-time between 65 
and 70 with a disposable income 90% of past earnings and finally retiring completely with a 90% 
replacement rate. The ratings attached to retirement trajectories are used to estimate a stylized 
structural model of retirement behaviour. One of the findings points at a general aversion for 
working full-time after the age of 65.  
Also, the authors perform simulations based on the previous estimates. They find that the 
majority of respondents would choose phased rather than full retirement, even in the presence of 
a flexible retirement age window. According to the simulations, many of the potential partial 
retirees were choosing early retirement in the scenario where partial retirement was not an 
option. This would imply a substantial labor supply increase due to the availability of gradual 
retirement.  
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3.3  Country-specific developments  
In this section we focus on pension reforms in Italy, Sweden and Latvia. These countries have 
recently introduced a NDC pension system, characterized by a flexible retirement age. Given the 
recent debate on the desirable characteristics of the pension systems and the NDC schemes, it is 
of particular interest to describe their actual degree of actuarial neutrality and fairness. We do it 
by means of a short literature review on the incentives to retire (“money’s worth measures”, see 
Geanakoplos, Mitchell and Zeldes, 2000) provided by the pension systems in these countries.   
The money’s worth measures (MWM henceforth) we consider are: social security wealth, net 
present value ratio, internal rate of return, accrual and implicit tax rate. In box 1 we show their 
formulae, as in Belloni, Borella and Fornero (2005) and Ferraresi and Fornero (2000). 
Computations in other studies follow a very similar approach. The first three are measures of 
global incentives, i.e. measures of the generosity of the pension system,30 while the last two 
evaluate marginal incentives, i.e. the financial changes that a worker has to face in case she 
postpones retirement. Under the hypothesis that leisure, even in retirement, is a normal good, 
global incentives provide a useful proxy to evaluate “income effects”, while marginal incentives 
capture the “substitution effect”. In this perspective, a “generous” system would be 
characterised, with respect to a less generous system, by a lower average retirement age. The same 
would be true of a system entailing a high implicit tax rate.  
 
Box 1 – Money’s worth measures formulae   
                                                 
30 MWM for Latvia, to our knowledge, are not available. We instead found some evidence on the replacement rates. 
For an evaluation of the appropriateness of this indicator when analyzing individual choices, see e.g. Ferraresi and 
Fornero (2000). 
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contributions, all due to the additional year of work. A negative accrual means that the increase in the pension 
benefit is insufficient to offset the costs of postponement, thus inflicting an implicit tax on the continuation of 
work.  
 
Consequently, the tax rate is defined as follows: 
A
A
A w
AccrT −=
 
that is, minus the ratio of the accrual to labour income. 
 
Italy 
Fornero and Castellino (2001) and Ferraresi and Fornero (2000) compute MWM for the 
Italian pension system after the reform of 1995 for some representative (private and public) 
employees, assuming constant mortality. They consider the cohorts born between 1942 and 1988 
who, under the assumptions of the model, retire in the period 2000-2051. Therefore, their study 
provides an evaluation of how the financial incentives change throughout the transitional period 
from the DB to the DC system, as well as in the future steady state.  
Table 8 presents simulated global incentives (NPVR and internal rate of return) for a male 
private employee, retiring at age 57, having accrued a seniority of 35 years. For the years up to 
1997, the macroeconomic environment is defined by the historical growth rates of wages and, for 
subsequent years, by a constant rate of growth of productivity equal to 1.5 per cent. The rate of 
interest used to calculate the present value of contributions and benefits is the same for all 
cohorts and is equal to 2 per cent.     
The table shows a progressive, continuous reduction of money’s worth from the oldest 
cohorts to the youngest up to the attainment of a steady state. While all cohorts prior to that of 
1967 still benefit from “gifts” from the favorable legislation of the past (NPVR higher than one 
hundred), participation in the public system begins to generate a “loss” from the subsequent 
cohorts. The imperfect actuarial neutrality in steady state reflects both the macroeconomic 
assumptions used in the simulations, which assume dynamic efficiency in the long run, and the 
way the pension formula incorporates changes in life expectancy. Legal transformation 
coefficients used to convert the accrued fund at retirement into the pension, in fact, assume 
unisex mortality rates. Given the sizeable differences in longevity between genders, this 
mechanism redistributes toward women.  
 
Table 8 - Money’s worth measures by cohort (global incentives): Italy  
 Cohorts NPVR IRR 
1943 143 3.25 
1948 136 3.06 
defined benefit 
1953 127 2.83 
1958 109 2.31 
1963 102 2.07 
1968 95 1.85 
Pro rata 
1973 88 1.58 
1978 87 1.57 
1983 87 1.57 
defined contribution 
1988 87 1.57 
 
Notes: percentage values, males, private employees, discount rate 2 percent, productivity growth 1.5 percent, 
retirement at age 57 with 35 years of seniority. 
Source: Ferraresi and Fornero (2000).  
 
Analogous considerations apply to the analysis of the internal rate of return. The trend of this 
indicator shows a strong decrease: from values around 3.2 per cent for cohorts close to 
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retirement in 2000, it converges to the value of 1.5 per cent characteristic of the steady state, this 
being the hypothesis for the growth of productivity. MWM results for other retirement ages (not 
shown) highlight how the DB system is even less generous in case of postponed retirement, while 
the generosity of the DC is almost independent on the retirement age.   
Table 9 shows marginal incentives (accrual and tax rate) for the same representative agents 
and under the same assumptions of Table 8. In addition to the retirement at age 57, however, it 
also considers retirement at age 59 and 62 (to which correspond seniorities of 37 and 40 years 
respectively).  
The figures reveal an especially sharp taxation (up to 70 percent of the expected wage, for 
workers retiring with a seniority of 40 years) for the oldest cohorts, whose pension is determined 
exclusively using the DB formula. For the pro rata cohorts, however, the taxation of pension 
wealth is far from negligible. It may be traced back to the poor link between contributions and 
benefits, typical of the DB formula, which incorporates no actuarial correction for different life 
expectancy at retirement. The disincentive drops as the contribution-based component grows 
progressively in the pension calculation. For the cohorts of steady state the taxation is almost 
zero (a slight taxation is motivated by the dynamic efficiency assumptions).  
 
Table 9 – Money’s worth measures by cohort and seniority (marginal incentives): Italy  
Cohorts  Accrual (thousand of euro 2000) Tax rate (% values) 
  Seniority 
  35 37 40 35 37 40 
defined benefit 1943 -10.21 -12.20 -16.04 43 52 72 
 1948 -12.80 -14.34 -16.98 52 59 72 
 1953 -13.25 -14.92 -17.01 53 61 72 
Pro rata 1958 -7.38 -7.36 -7.19 29 29 29 
 1963 -5.16 -5.09 -4.91 20 20 20 
 1968 -3.00 -2.87 -2.66 11 11 10 
 1973 -0.99 -0.84 -0.64 4 3 2 
defined 
contribution 1978 -1.00 -0.85 -0.64 4 3 
2 
 1983 -1.07 -0.92 -0.70 4 3 2 
 1988 -1.16 -0.98 -0.74 4 3 2 
 
Notes: males, private employees, discount rate 2 percent, productivity growth 1.5 percent. 
Source: Ferraresi and Fornero (2000). 
 
Belloni and Maccheroni (2006) evaluate actuarial features of the Italian pension system in 
presence of longevity increases. They extend the model in Ferraresi and Fornero (2000) by 
having endogenous (i.e. mortality-related) transformation coefficients. Two different mortality 
projections, developed ad hoc for the paper, are exploited. The first one, more standard, is cross-
sectional, while the second, which disentangles cohort and time effects in the evolution of 
mortality, is longitudinal. The first one is used in a scenario which represents the present 
legislation, while the second is used to simulate a more actuarially neutral system, which is taken 
as a benchmark of actuarial fairness and neutrality. For each representative agent they compute 
MWM in both of the scenarios, and they quantify how much the system departs from the 
benchmark by comparing the two sets of results. 
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Simulated tax rates for a private employee, retiring at age 57 (having accrued a seniority of 35 
years) are shown in Figure 4 for the two scenarios. Scenario 2 shows results very similar to 
Ferraresi and Fornero (2000), because cohort-and-gender specific longevity changes are offset by 
changes in the transformation coefficients. Scenario 1 highlights instead huge spikes of taxation, 
equal to 30-40 percent. They are the consequence of the fact that transformation coefficients are 
updated to longevity changes only every ten year. A worker who has to decide whether to retire 
or to continue to work in the year before the revision of the transformation coefficients faces a 
very strong constraint. Her pension and her SSW, in fact, would be considerably cut if she 
decided to continue to work. 
 
Figure 4 – Tax rate by cohort in different scenarios: Italy 
 
 
Notes: scenario 1 is the actuarial benchmark (i.e. an hypothetical pension system in which transformation coefficients are 
computed according to cohort-and-gender specific mortality rates and are updated to mortality changes every year; scenario 2 
represents the current legislation; males, private employees, discount rate 2 percent, productivity growth 1.5 percent. 
Source: Belloni and Maccheroni (2006).  
  
Sweden 
MWM for Sweden before the 1999 reform are described in Palme and Svensson (2004). 
Computations include both the income security system (disability, sickness and unemployment 
insurances) and the compulsory old-age pension (basic pension, STP31 and the part-time 
retirement pension). They estimate retirement probabilities using as explanatory variables various 
MWM. Financial incentives are computed for the sample used in the estimation, which is given 
by the workers born between 1927 and 1940. Thus, only few of them are partly affected by the 
reform. 
We present some selected results in Table 10. It shows, for each possible retirement age 
between 55 and 70, median SSW, median, 10th and 90th percentiles of accrual, standard deviation 
and median tax rate. Both the analysis of the accrual and the tax rate reveals a quite high level of 
taxation of the old DB scheme. Median accrual exhibits a marked increase at age 57. This is due 
to the rule that requires at least three years of work between age 55 and 59 to be eligible for the 
STP pension. A second discontinuity is at age 59. According to the authors, this can be due to 
the way pensions for central and local government employees are computed.  
 
                                                 
31 Occupational pension scheme for blue-collar workers.  
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Table 10 – Money’s worth measures by age: Sweden, DB scheme 
 
 
Notes: sample statistics; SD is standard deviation; SSW and accrual are in 1995  SKr, tax rate are in percentage points.  
Source: Palme and Svensson (2004).  
 
MWM for Sweden which are more comparable with those shown for Italy are provided in 
Palme and Svensson (1999). They consider a representative agent, born in 1930 and assigned to 
the STP occupational scheme. In the base case, the individual earns a lifetime income equal to the 
median income of the population and cannot access the disability insurance scheme. 
Computations include housing allowances and take into account income taxation. Flows are 
discounted at 3 percent. 
Results for the base case are shown in Table 11. It shows replacement rates32, SSW, accrual 
and two kinds of tax rates. The system provides a tax rate throughout the entire range of ages 
considered. Taxation is quite low up to age 59 because those who retire before age 60 cannot 
claim the old-age pension (and thus the number of years for which the pension can be obtained 
do not diminish postponing retirement by one year). Taxation is much higher between age 60 and 
64, and is lower again after age 64. The difference in taxation between these two age brackets can 
be explained by the fact that employers do not pay contributions for workers above age 65. 
To facilitate detecting which components of the institutional system generate the variations in 
the tax rate (especially in the age bracket 60-64), the authors present additional simulations in 
which an element – income taxes, housing allowances and STP pension – are in turn excluded. In 
the last column of Table 11 we add a column which describes the tax rate of a simulation in 
which only the gross-of-taxes old-age pension is considered. We can see how taxation is 
dramatically reduced if income taxes and housing allowances are not included into the 
computations. The classification of the results in three age brackets (55-59, 60-64 and 65 and 
older) is even clearer here. The old-age system is almost actuarially neutral up to age 59. After 
that, and up to age 64, taxation becomes positive, and increases. At age 65 the system is 
actuarially neutral, but after that age taxation is present again. The 0.5 percent reduction in the 
monthly pension payments for each month of withdrawal before age 65 and the 0.7 percent 
increase for each month of delayed withdrawal after age 65 are not enough to offset the pensions 
given up and the contributions paid in the additional years of work.  
 
                                                 
32 Replacement rates start from age 59 because those who retire before age 60 cannot claim the old-age pension. 
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Table 11 – Money’s worth measures by age: Sweden DB scheme 
Last Age 
of Work
Replacement 
Rate SSW Accrual
Tax/       
subsidy
Tax/subsidy: 
Gross Public 
Pension only
54 … 1,168,183 … …
55 … 1,137,465 -30.717 .231 -.006
56 … 1.106.826 -30,640 .221 -.017
57 … 1,098,951 -7,874 .056 -.035
58 … 1,077,393 -21,558 .153 -.044
59 .459 1,056,086 -21.307 .146 -.066
60 .485 1,004,338 -51,749 .350 .055
61 .545 953,215 -51,123 .358 .130
62 .572 916,429 -36,786 .253 .173
63 .620 874,964 -41,465 .290 .233
64 .729 829,879 -45,086 .313 .280
65 .785 824,727 -5,152 .036 -.006
66 .841 812,515 -12,212 .085 .062
67 .897 794,014 -18,501 .128 .123
68 .953 769,662 -24,353 .169 .178
69 1.011 741,892 -27,769 .193 .227  
 
Notes: SSW and accrual are in 1995 SKr, tax rate in percentage points.  
Source: Palme and Svensson (1999): table 9.3 and table 9.5.  
 
Simulations of MWM for the new NDC Swedish pension system can be found in Fenge and 
Werding (2004). They follow a macro-based approach which takes into account the projected 
demographic changes in the next decades, and accordingly imposes financial constraints to the 
public pension budget. In their computations, they consider some male representative workers – 
one worker for each cohort born from 1940 to 2000 – who start to work at age 20 and have a 
full-time career up to age 65, when they retire. In the last part of their career, they have some 
positive probabilities to become disable and thus to reduce the hours worked as well as to benefit  
from a disability pension. Survivor’s benefit in favour of their wives is also incorporated into the 
computations.  
Results are presented in terms of an indicator –  not included in box 1 because it is not of a 
standard use in micro-based computations – which they call “implicit tax rate”. It is given by the 
social security wealth computed at the beginning of the working career divided by the lifetime 
earnings, and has nothing to do with the tax rate we show in the rest of the section. Given that all 
the contributions paid and all the pensions received along the career are incorporated into the 
computation, it measures the generosity of the pension system, and thus has a similar meaning to 
the NPVR. Flows are discounted at 4 percent, while productivity constantly grows at 1.75 
percent in each year.  
Results are shown in Figure 5 both for the old and the new pension system. In the old system, 
the tax would have increased from less than 3 percent for those born in 1940 to more than 20 
percent for those born in 2000. After the recent reform, taxation levels at about 12 percent for 
individuals born in 1954 or later, completely subject to the new rules. This results reflects both 
the good actuarial features of the Swedish NDC system, and the fact that both the current 
pension levels and contributions are financially compatible with demographic projections in the 
long run.   
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Figure 5 – Tax rate by cohort: Sweden, pre and post reform 
 
Notes: “implicit tax rate” is given by the SSW computed at the beginning of the working career divided by the lifetime earnings; 
males, retirement at age 65 with 45 years of seniority, discount rate 4 percent, productivity growth 1.75 percent. 
Source: Fenge and Werding (2004).  
 
Latvia 
Money’s worth measures for Latvia, at least to our knowledge, are not available. However, a 
first rough indication of the generosity of the Latvian pension system can be obtained by looking 
at the replacement rates. Fox and Palmer (1999) simulate replacement rates under both the old 
and the new system and compare the generosity of the two schemes. They exclude from the 
analysis both the transition to the new rules and the effects of the second funded pillar. The 
workers are assumed to earn a lifetime wage equal to the following proportion of the 1996 
average wage: 1, ½ and 1.5. We show the results in Table 12. 
 
Table 12 – Pension as a share of average wage: Latvia, pre and post reform 
 
Source: Fox and Palmer (1999).  
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The table shows that most new pensioners with full years of service retiring after 60 (with a 
seniority of at least 42 years) do not suffer a benefit decline compared with the old system, while 
early retirees are penalised. Benefits are larger for those with higher lifetime income, and lower 
for the poorest. This result is an immediate consequence of the contribution-based formula, 
which has a more limited redistributive impact.   
Replacement rates, also including the second pillar (FDC), under different assumptions on 
retirement age and on market return for different cohorts, are shown in Vanovska (2006). 
Although results widely vary from one scenario to the other, they globally provide a picture in 
which the generosity of the new pension scheme is extremely low, and thus “global” incentives to 
early retirement are extremely low as well. According to Casey (2004), both the early and the late 
retirement provisions (retirement above the normal retirement age) are likely to be “very close to 
actuarial neutrality”, but computations of marginal incentives are not provided. In circumstances 
of unsatisfactory adequacy, however, retirement choices plausibly cannot be driven by 
considerations at margin, and the lack of analytical information on actuarial fairness does not 
represent a severe limit for the analysis.   
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Appendix: descriptive tables 
 
Sources of income of older people  
Data are mainly drawn from the SHARE database. However, since SHARE does not contain 
information about the United Kingdom and Finland, data for these two countries come instead 
from the ECHP. Information about Latvia is derived – when available – from national sources.   
 
 
Table 13 – Sources of income, by age brackets, 2000, percentages  
 Income sources 
 
Age  
group Work 
income 
Non-work 
income 
Social 
security 
income 
of which: 
old-age 
pension 
Total N
50-54 86.1 5.1 8.8 0.7 100 575
55-59 77.3 9.5 13.3 2.4 100 452
60-64 43.5 12.1 44.3 13.7 100 374
65-69 16.2 4.2 79.6 66.1 100 307
Finland  
70+ 6.0 5.2 88.8 79.7 100 455
50-54 84.8 4.8 10.5 3.2 100 698
55-59 75.7 6.4 17.9 8.2 100 658
60-64 46.0 9.0 45.0 32.9 100 459
65-69 18.0 10.5 71.5 62.5 100 398
United 
Kingdom  
70+ 2.5 9.8 87.7 74.2 100 1,124
 
Source: ECHP, own elaboration.  
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Table 14 – Sources of income, by age brackets, 2003, percentages  
 Sources of income   
 
Age 
groups  Self-
employment Employment 
Old-age 
pensions 
Total  
pensions TOTAL N
50 - 54 95.10 2.77 0.33 1.82 100 290
55 - 59 5.19 31.65 29.83 61.26 100 338
60 - 64 1.08 4.87 74.98 89.64 100 418
65 - 69 1.03 2.36 83.68 94.84 100 292
Austria  
70+ 0.56 3.12 75.20 91.69 100 551
50 - 54 14.23 81.45 0.43 4.11 100 608
55 - 59 18.61 70.02 1.40 11.20 100 461
60 - 64 11.48 40.59 30.47 41.94 100 587
65 - 69 6.34 9.73 66.46 80.24 100 527
Germany  
70+ 1.33 7.78 71.00 88.06 100 715
50 - 54 8.10 78.57 0.00 12.81 100 496
55 - 59 5.91 79.22 0.21 13.52 100 621
60 - 64 11.66 43.75 2.06 41.08 100 521
65 - 69 3.42 6.03 55.09 84.21 100 426
Sweden  
70+ 1.09 1.26 73.07 94.65 100 873
50 - 54 11.09 69.00 0.00 18.86 100 581
55 - 59 4.41 50.48 0.31 36.41 100 646
60 - 64 1.59 9.89 0.24 82.83 100 476
65 - 69 3.34 4.21 41.64 77.90 100 374
Netherlands  
70+ 0.11 0.13 4.19 99.42 100 711
50 - 54 15.90 70.82 2.76 13.26 100 380
55 - 59 39.04 46.93 7.37 13.93 100 362
60 - 64 25.55 53.38 7.77 21.03 100 335
65 - 69 35.87 6.23 45.82 57.37 100 361
Spain  
70+ 9.40 3.73 48.36 86.83 100 866
50 - 54 27.00 60.87 0.53 12.07 100 362
55 - 59 20.53 38.25 5.55 40.99 100 517
60 - 64 95.07 0.78 0.74 4.13 100 514
65 - 69 7.13 8.08 15.88 84.55 100 406
Italy  
70+ 4.52 2.67 31.25 92.76 100 657
50 - 54 9.06 83.71 1.60 7.04 100 371
55 - 59 12.96 65.72 5.55 21.27 100 294
60 - 64 4.05 28.04 53.06 67.64 100 240
65 - 69 0.03 0.62 63.46 99.15 100 230
France  
70+ 0.08 0.38 59.44 99.15 100 541
50 - 54 0.86 98.02 0.00 0.78 100 322
55 - 59 12.87 75.48 0.08 11.40 100 319
60 - 64 6.83 50.16 0.00 41.82 100 252
65 - 69 4.01 17.40 23.07 75.78 100 184
Denmark  
70+ 0.39 0.58 12.79 98.46 100 487
 
Source: SHARE, own elaboration.  
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Table 15 – Sources of income of individuals aged 50+, by employment status, 2003, percentages  
 Sources of income  
 
Employment  
Status  Self -
employment Employment  
Old-age  
pensions 
Total  
pensions TOTAL N 
Retired  0.38 4.36 74.67 92.18 100 1263
Employed / Self-empl  97.40 2.37 0.00 0.07 100 356
Unemployed 1.60 29.05 0.00 69.36 100 45
Sick /disabled  0.00 26.48 0.00 68.92 100 26
Austria  
Homemaker 0.18 3.69 19.51 76.30 100 233
Retired  0.58 13.58 67.06 83.15 100 1532
Employed / Self-empl  20.78 76.12 0.45 1.10 100 884
Unemployed 0.33 50.17 0.05 48.45 100 159
Sick /disabled  1.21 9.17 5.36 87.82 100 74
Germany  
Homemaker 2.77 19.96 29.94 73.30 100 303
Retired  1.50 6.26 51.68 88.11 100 1602
Employed / Self-empl  10.48 82.97 0.64 5.71 100 1229
Unemployed 1.65 53.61 0.00 40.49 100 64
Sick /disabled  0.90 34.77 1.54 61.69 100 80
Sweden  
Homemaker 1.36 1.08 58.69 77.79 100 26
Retired  0.20 0.73 3.66 98.11 100 959
Employed / Self-empl  11.00 79.48 0.24 9.03 100 897
Unemployed 0.22 18.63 0.00 20.36 100 55
Sick /disabled  0.56 13.21 8.32 77.88 100 219
Netherlands 
Homemaker 1.08 5.84 50.54 88.50 100 691
Retired  6.64 6.90 60.90 86.25 100 833
Employed / Self-empl  37.72 61.09 0.03 1.18 100 472
Unemployed 1.90 60.73 0.00 36.25 100 74
Sick /disabled  3.54 7.60 5.99 88.60 100 90
Spain  
Homemaker 22.97 26.22 3.25 50.69 100 806
Retired  77.08 1.34 4.93 21.54 100 1384
Employed / Self-empl  90.24 8.86 0.10 0.89 100 471
Unemployed 32.34 62.53 0.00 5.13 100 42
Sick /disabled  0.00 4.12 9.06 95.88 100 24
Italy  
Homemaker 1.40 1.42 27.58 96.40 100 591
Retired  0.18 4.85 62.29 94.65 100 888
Employed / Self-empl  12.14 86.73 0.31 1.04 100 542
Unemployed 0.38 54.38 0.00 45.17 100 63
Sick /disabled  0.00 11.72 1.13 87.34 100 41
France  
Homemaker 4.75 9.66 28.63 84.97 100 189
Retired  0.78 3.02 12.40 95.42 100 864
Employed / Self-empl  2.23 97.30 0.03 0.26 100 663
Unemployed 3.18 57.32 0.00 39.50 100 72
Sick /disabled  2.50 15.38 6.00 78.15 100 52
Denmark  
Homemaker 2.17 40.52 33.14 50.64 100 25
 
Source: SHARE, own elaboration.  
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Table 16 – Sources of income of individuals aged 50+, by employment status, 2000, percentages  
 Sources of income  
 
Employment  
status  Work income 
Non-work  
income 
Social 
security 
income 
of which: 
Old-age 
pension 
Total N
Employed   66.37 8.11 25.52 9.26 100 925
Unemployed   46.02 5.85 48.14 2.55 100 112
Retired   13.53 8.11 78.36 53.60 100 1101
Other inactive  40.16 27.08 32.76 0.00 100 24
Finland   
Missing   0.00 27.90 72.10 0.00 100 1
Employed   84.63 5.96 9.42 5.61 100 1107
Unemployed   57.54 10.67 31.79 1.92 100 34
Retired   6.62 10.35 83.03 69.69 100 1715
United 
Kingdom 
Other inactive  34.98 11.60 53.43 19.39 100 481
 
Source: ECHP, own elaboration.  
  
 
 
 
 
Table 17 – Latvian households’ disposable income, monthly average per household member, 2000 – 2005, 
percentages  
 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Wage and salary 50.70 50.66 54.97 55.37 
Net income from self-employment 7.83 8.38 7.96 8.36 
Transfers 23.59 22.81 21.32 20.44 
…of which pensions 17.06 16.19 15.01 15.28 
Other income 0.83 1.96 0.74 0.54 
Total   100 100 100 100 
 
Source: Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia.   
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Employment status of older people 
Data are mainly drawn from the SHARE database. However, since SHARE does not contain 
information about the United Kingdom and Finland, data for these two countries come instead 
from the ECHP. Information about Latvia is derived – when available – from national sources.   
 
 
Table 18 – Employment status, by age brackets, 2001, percentages 
  Employment status 
 
Age  
groups Employed Unemployed Retired Other  inactive Total 
50 - 54 85.22 6.09 6.96 1.74 100
55 - 59 69.18 12.64 15.30 2.88 100
60 - 64 25.13 4.28 70.32 0.27 100
65 - 69 7.17 0.65 92.18 0.00 100
Finland   
70+ 1.54 0.44 98.02 0.00 100
50 - 54 70.92 2.44 3.72 22.92 100
55 - 59 62.16 1.52 12.16 24.16 100
60 - 64 32.24 1.53 48.15 18.08 100
65 - 69 9.30 0.00 82.91 7.79 100
United 
Kingdom 
70+ 1.60 0.00 94.13 4.27 100
 
Source: ECHP, own elaboration.  
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Table 19 – Employment status, by age brackets, 2004, percentages 
 Employment status   
 
Age 
groups  Retired Working Unemployed Disabled Homemaker Other Total 
50 - 54 15.03 60.49 8.74 3.15 8.74 3.85 100 
55 - 59 46.87 29.25 4.48 3.58 13.13 2.69 100 
60 - 64 83.45 3.89 0.24 0.24 11.19 0.97 100 
65 - 69 87.63 1.37 0.00 0.00 11.00 0.00 100 
Austria  
70+ 85.34 0.19 0.00 0.37 13.17 0.93 100 
50 - 54 1.32 73.88 10.25 3.14 9.75 1.65 100 
55 - 59 10.46 53.59 13.94 5.45 12.42 3.92 100 
60 - 64 61.96 16.70 3.44 4.13 11.53 2.24 100 
65 - 69 91.62 3.05 0.19 0.38 4.76 0.00 100 
Germany  
70+ 88.61 0.84 0.00 0.14 10.13 0.14 100 
50 - 54 6.48 82.79 3.64 4.25 0.61 2.02 100 
55 - 59 11.97 75.08 4.37 4.53 1.13 2.91 100 
60 - 64 45.05 43.88 2.91 4.66 1.36 2.14 100 
65 - 69 95.51 3.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.47 100 
Sweden  
70+ 98.05 0.46 0.00 0.11 0.92 0.11 100 
50 - 54 0.52 65.62 4.01 10.47 17.45 1.92 100 
55 - 59 6.90 50.00 2.35 9.87 25.71 5.17 100 
60 - 64 30.43 13.83 2.34 11.70 30.00 11.70 100 
65 - 69 72.43 1.35 0.00 1.35 23.51 1.35 100 
Netherlands  
70+ 70.82 0.99 0.00 2.97 21.95 3.26 100 
50 - 54 4.01 54.01 6.95 4.81 26.47 3.74 100 
55 - 59 9.60 39.27 8.19 6.78 33.05 3.11 100 
60 - 64 30.42 20.48 4.22 3.92 36.14 4.82 100 
65 - 69 59.49 1.13 0.00 1.13 36.26 1.98 100 
Spain  
70+ 55.28 0.23 0.00 3.05 35.09 6.34 100 
50 - 54 10.61 58.66 2.79 0.28 26.26 1.40 100 
55 - 59 34.24 27.63 2.92 1.75 31.71 1.75 100 
60 - 64 67.84 10.20 2.16 0.78 18.04 0.98 100 
65 - 69 75.74 2.97 0.00 0.99 20.30 0.00 100 
Italy  
70+ 78.96 0.92 0.00 0.77 18.43 0.92 100 
50 - 54 4.01 73.93 5.44 5.73 9.74 1.15 100 
55 - 59 18.95 50.18 9.12 4.56 13.33 3.86 100 
60 - 64 77.06 7.79 3.46 0.43 9.96 1.30 100 
65 - 69 92.24 0.46 0.00 0.00 5.48 1.37 100 
France  
70+ 85.91 0.00 0.00 0.59 12.52 0.98 100 
50 - 54 7.26 78.55 7.89 2.84 0.63 2.52 100 
55 - 59 13.23 66.13 10.65 6.13 1.61 2.26 100 
60 - 64 67.20 23.60 0.40 5.60 2.40 0.80 100 
65 - 69 87.29 7.18 0.55 1.66 2.21 1.10 100 
Denmark  
70+ 96.86 0.84 0.00 0.63 1.05 0.42 100 
 
Source: SHARE, own elaboration.  
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Table 20 – Employment rates, by age groups and gender, Latvia, 2000 – 2005  
 Males Females Total  
 2000 
50 - 54 68 71.3 69.8 
55 - 59 62.7 38.2 48.9 
60 - 64 33.3 16.1 23.3 
65+ 10.2 5 6.7 
Total  54.6 42.9 48.2 
 2005 
50 - 54 74.8 73.7 74.2 
55 - 59 70 60.1 64.5 
60 - 64 41.3 30.8 35.2 
65+ 21.3 9.9 14.1 
Total  62.9 52.1 57.1 
 
Source: Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia.   
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Table 21 – Employment status of individuals aged 50+, by gender, 2004, percentages 
 Employment status  
 
Gender 
Retired Working Unemployed Disabled Homemaker Other Total 
Male  44.50 54.21 51.11 61.54 1.72 37.14 41.42 
Female 55.50 45.79 48.89 38.46 98.28 62.86 58.58 Austria  
Total  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
         
Male  50.20 52.04 53.46 60.81 0.66 34.78 45.90 
Female 49.80 47.96 46.54 39.19 99.34 65.22 54.10 Germany  
Total  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
         
Male  47.50 46.14 51.56 43.75 0.00 31.82 46.31 
Female 52.50 53.86 48.44 56.25 100.00 68.18 53.69 Sweden  
Total  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
        
Male  67.15 54.96 58.18 46.58 1.88 55.47 45.95 
Female 32.85 45.04 41.82 53.42 98.12 44.53 54.05 Netherlands  
Total  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
         
Male  73.59 57.63 43.24 42.22 0.87 23.53 41.48 
Female 26.41 42.37 56.76 57.78 99.13 76.47 58.52 Spain  
Total  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
         
Male  57.08 58.60 71.43 54.17 0.17 40.74 44.15 
Female 42.92 41.40 28.57 45.83 99.83 59.26 55.85 Italy  
Total  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
         
Male  50.90 44.65 41.27 48.78 3.17 29.63 43.12 
Female 49.10 55.35 58.73 51.22 96.83 70.37 56.88 France  
Total  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
         
Male  43.63 48.57 51.39 34.62 4.00 39.13 45.03 
Female 56.37 51.43 48.61 65.38 96.00 60.87 54.97 Denmark  
Total  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
 
Source: SHARE, own elaboration. 
 
 
Table 22 – Employment status of individuals aged 50+, by gender, 2001, percentages 
 Employment status  
 
Gender  
Employed Unemployed Retired Other  inactive Total 
Male  51.03 47.32 47.59 20.83 48.75 
Female  48.97 52.68 52.41 79.17 51.25 Finland   
Total   100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
       
Male  55.28 61.76 40.99 28.07 44.08 
Female  44.72 38.24 59.01 71.93 55.92 United Kingdom  
Total   100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Source: ECHP, own elaboration. 
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Table 23 – Working time of individuals aged 50+, by gender and age bracket, 2003, percentages 
  Age groups and working time  
  50 – 54  55 – 59 60 – 64 65 – 69 70+ 
  
Full-
time 
Part-
time 
Full-
time 
Part-
time 
Full-
time 
Part-
time 
Full-
time 
Part-
time 
Full-
time 
Part-
time 
Male 97.2 2.8 97.1 2.9 83.3 16.7 80.0 20.0 88.9 11.1 
Female 73.2 26.8 67.9 32.1 47.6 52.4 30.8 69.2 81.8 18.2 Austria  
Total  86.8 13.2 84.4 15.6 66.7 33.3 44.4 55.6 85.0 15.0 
            
Male 95.5 4.5 94.7 5.3 78.3 21.7 47.8 52.2 30.0 70.0 
Female 61.0 39.0 50.0 50.0 46.2 53.8 7.1 92.9 18.2 81.8 Germany  
Total  77.0 23.0 75.4 24.6 65.9 34.1 32.4 67.6 23.8 76.2 
            
Male 97.1 2.9 92.2 7.8 73.2 26.8 28.1 71.9 32.0 68.0 
Female 79.3 20.7 81.1 18.9 63.2 36.8 31.8 68.2 37.5 62.5 Sweden  
Total  88.0 12.0 86.1 13.9 68.4 31.6 29.6 70.4 33.3 66.7 
            
Male 92.0 8.0 85.2 14.8 66.0 34.0 30.0 70.0 33.3 66.7 
Female 42.6 57.4 31.7 68.3 23.5 76.5 0.0 100.0 66.7 33.3 Netherlands 
Total  68.7 31.3 63.5 36.5 49.4 50.6 18.8 81.3 38.1 61.9 
            
Male 95.8 4.2 87.6 12.4 81.6 18.4 80.0 20.0 77.8 22.2 
Female 80.8 19.2 76.1 23.9 57.1 42.9 0.0 100.0 33.3 66.7 Spain  
Total  89.0 11.0 82.7 17.3 74.3 25.7 40.0 60.0 66.7 33.3 
            
Male 81.4 18.6 88.3 11.7 75.4 24.6 52.9 47.1 62.5 37.5 
Female 80.2 19.8 55.6 44.4 47.4 52.6 81.8 18.2 57.1 42.9 Italy  
Total  80.9 19.1 77.1 22.9 68.4 31.6 64.3 35.7 60.9 39.1 
            
Male 95.9 4.1 95.1 4.9 70.0 30.0 100.0 0.0 50.0 50.0 
Female 77.6 22.4 61.0 39.0 83.3 16.7 0.0 100.0   France  
Total  87.8 12.2 75.5 24.5 77.3 22.7 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 
            
Male 96.2 3.8 91.5 8.5 69.1 30.9 35.0 65.0 8.3 91.7 
Female 80.2 19.8 78.4 21.6 57.7 42.3 55.6 44.4 80.0 20.0 Denmark  
Total  88.4 11.6 84.8 15.2 65.4 34.6 41.4 58.6 29.4 70.6 
Note: following Börsch-Supan et. al (2005), a weekly working time of 30 hours and more is defined as full-time, whereas a working 
time of less than 30 hours is defined as part-time. Source: SHARE, own elaboration.  
 
Table 24 – Working time, by gender and age bracket, 2000, percentages 
    Age groups and working time 
  50 – 54 55 – 59 60 – 64 65 – 69 70+ 
    
Full-
time 
Part-
time 
Full-
time 
Part-
time 
Full-
time 
Part-
time 
Full-
time 
Part-
time 
Full-
time 
Part-
time 
Male  96.4 3.6 93.9 6.1 81.4 18.6 74.5 25.5 41.5 58.5 
Female  93.2 6.8 86.5 13.5 74.0 26.0 54.5 45.5 66.7 33.3 Finland   
Total  94.8 5.2 90.2 9.8 78.0 22.0 69.9 30.1 44.7 55.3 
             
Male  97.4 2.6 95.2 4.8 86.2 13.8 60.8 39.2 44.9 55.1 
Female  67.2 32.8 59.4 40.6 47.5 52.5 38.4 61.6 32.1 67.9 
United 
Kingdom  
Total  82.5 17.5 79.3 20.7 72.6 27.4 52.7 47.3 42.8 57.2 
Note: following Börsch-Supan et. al (2005), a weekly working time of 30 hours and more is defined as full-time, whereas a working time of 
less than 30 hours is defined as part-time.  
Source: ECHP, own elaboration.
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Partial pensions  
 
These tables provide an overview of participation to partial pensions in the relevant countries, 
based on national sources.  
 
 
Finland 
 
Table 25 - Number of part-time pensioners and as a share of total pensioners, by sex, 1989 – 2004 
 Both sexes  Males Females 
Year All pensions 
Part-time 
pensions % 
 All 
pensions
Part-time 
pensions % 
All 
pensions 
Part-time 
pensions % 
1989 1149211 254 0.02  461306 141 0.03 687905 113 0.02
1990 1160983 427 0.04  467828 199 0.04 693155 228 0.03
1991 1171324 699 0.06  474592 330 0.07 696732 369 0.05
1992 1182934 1213 0.10  482313 516 0.11 700621 697 0.10
1993 1198607 2257 0.19  492864 1029 0.21 705743 1228 0.17
1994 1210986 4467 0.37  501340 2030 0.40 709646 2437 0.34
1995 1219747 5437 0.45  506703 2252 0.44 713044 2912 0.41
1996 1232653 6104 0.50  513840 2861 0.56 718813 3243 0.45
1997 1244233 6932 0.56  519307 3172 0.61 724926 3760 0.52
1998 1254866 10924 0.87  524764 4945 0.94 730102 5979 0.82
1999 1269981 18284 1.44  532765 8301 1.56 737216 9983 1.35
2000 1284145 24533 1.91  540883 11167 2.06 743262 13366 1.80
2001 1296478 29073 2.24  548030 13577 2.48 748448 15496 2.07
2002 1317300 39542 3.00  560228 18524 3.31 757072 21018 2.78
2003 1329988 41195 3.10  568673 19361 3.40 761315 21834 2.87
2004 1338002 36438 2.72  573769 17191 3.00 764233 19247 2.52
 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Pensioners in Finland 2004, http://www.etk.fi/page.asp?Section=13063 
 
 
 
Table 26 - Number of part-time pensioners, by sex and age brackets, 2004  
 Both sexes Males Females 
Age All Part-time pension All 
Part-time 
pension All 
Part-time 
pension 
       
Up to 19 24 560 - 12 406 - 12 154 - 
20 - 44 46 922 - 25 283 - 21 639 - 
45 - 54 80 559 - 40 790 - 39 769 - 
55 - 59 113 199 17 061 54 731 7 864 58 468 9 197 
60 - 64 207 770 19 377 96 714 9 327 111 056 10 050 
65 and over  864 992 - 343 845 - 521 147 - 
All ages 1 338 002 36 438 573 769 17 191 764 233 19 247 
 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Pensioners in Finland 2004, http://www.etk.fi/page.asp?Section=13063 
Note: One person may receive several pension benefits at the same time. For this reason, the figures of the tables 
cannot be summed up. 
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Sweden  
 
Table 27 – Number of pensioners receiving partial pension (delpension) and as a share of recipients of old-age 
pension, 1996 – 2003   
Year  Partial pensions Old-age pensions % Partial pension / old-age pensions 
1996 27000 1587866 1.70 
1997 18000 1592023 1.13 
1998 11000 1593845 0.69 
1999 8000 1596254 0.50 
2000 13000 1600918 0.81 
2001 10000 1589933 0.63 
2002 6000 1589206 0.38 
2003 2600   
 
Source: Statistical yearbook of Sweden 2006, downloaded from: 
http://www.scb.se/templates/Product____30937.asp, own calculations. 
 
 
 
 
Denmark 
 
Table 28 – Number of pensioners receiving partial pension (delpension) and as a share of recipients of old-age 
pensions, by sex and employment status  
  Men   Women   Total  
  Employees 
Self –
empl. Total 
%  
old-age Employees
Self –
empl.  Total 
%  
old-age  Total  
%  
old-age 
1997 1,754 1,747 3,501 1.22 506 469 975 0.23 4476 0.63 
1998 1,723 1,588 3,311 1.15 462 428 890 0.21 4201 0.59 
1999 1,687 1,403 3,090 1.07 413 366 779 0.19 3869 0.55 
2000 1,494 1,176 2,670 0.92 346 312 658 0.16 3328 0.47 
2001 1,282 972 2,254 0.78 286 269 555 0.13 2809 0.40 
 
Source:  
1. partial pensions: Modtagere af delpension, various years, downloaded from: 
http://www.dst.dk/Statistik/Nyt/Emneopdelt.aspx?si=15&msi=5.  
2. old-age pensions: Source: Statistics Denmark, downloaded from : 
http://www.statbank.dk/statbank5a/default.asp?w=1024 
Note: Total pensioners include: recipients of old-age pensions, Highest early retirement pension, Increased ordinary, 
early retirement pension, Ordinary early retirement pension, Disability or temporary supplement, Intermediate early 
retirement pension, New scheme for early retirement pension.  
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France  
 
 
Table 29 – Number of pensioners receiving partial pension(retraite progressive) 
 
Fraction  
receiving  
30 % 
(1)a 
Fraction 
receiving 
50 % 
(2) 
Fraction 
receiving 
70 % 
(3) 
Total 
(4) 
% 
(1)/(4) 
% 
(2)/(4) 
% 
(3)/(4) 
1989 112 289 257    658 17,02 43,92 39,06 
1990 139 386 398    923 15,06 41,82 43,12 
1991 160 423 440 1 023 15,64 41,35 43,01 
1992 157 553 495 1 205 13,03 45,89 41,08 
1993 137 577 573 1 287 10,64 44,83 44,52 
1994 113 544 559 1 216  9,29 44,74 45,97 
1995   92 516 533 1 141  8,06 45,22 46,71 
1996   72 465 513 1 050  6,86 44,29 48,86 
1997   63 457 485 1 005  6,27 45,47 48,26 
1998   61 406 457    924  6,60 43,94 49,46 
1999   61 347 436    844  7,23 41,11 51,66 
2000   73 316 383    772  9,46 40,93 49,61 
2001   68 298 357    723  9,41 41,22 49,38 
2002   73 276 367    716 10,20 38,55 51,26 
2003   82 242 349    673 12,18 35,96 51,86 
2004   59 177 288    524 11,26 33,78 54,96 
2005   44 128 245    417 10,55 30,70 58,75 
 
Source: Caisse Nationale D'assurance Vieillesse, Direction Actuariat Statistique – 93, Retraite Progressive Année 2005 
a Partial pension can be drawn as 30%, 50% or 70% of full pension depending on the number of hours worked.  
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Germany 
 
 
Table 30 – Number of pensioners receiving full and partial pension (teilrente), as of 2004 
 
Source: VDR – Statistick Rentenbestand, http://www.deutsche-rentenversicherung.de/ 
 
Men Women Men and women 
Full 
pension Partial pensions  
Full 
pension Partial pensions  
Full 
pension Partial pensions  
 
Age  
 1/3 1/2 2/3 Total 
% 
partial 
over 
full  
 1/3 1/2 2/3 Total 
% 
partial 
over 
full  
 1/3 1/2 2/3 Total 
% 
partial 
over 
full  
                   
60 79228 12 13 20 45 0.06 106983 27 42 36 105 0.10 186211 39 55 56 150 0.08 
61 112020 26 34 32 92 0.08 150972 51 67 87 205 0.14 262992 77 101 119 297 0.11 
62 141623 45 42 62 149 0.11 196083 77 97 75 249 0.13 337706 122 139 137 398 0.12 
63 278558 52 93 146 291 0.10 300812 137 251 156 544 0.18 579370 189 344 302 835 0.14 
64 360498 80 153 208 441 0.12 325429 176 249 196 621 0.19 685927 256 402 404 1062 0.15 
65 535214 31 61 76 168 0.03 534773 44 78 67 189 0.04 1069987 75 139 143 357 0.03 
66 519587 18 19 45 82 0.02 521774 17 38 28 83 0.02 1041361 35 57 73 165 0.02 
67 484596 16 25 35 76 0.02 492206 24 31 26 81 0.02 976802 40 56 61 157 0.02 
68 465777 7 25 32 64 0.01 482888 20 23 27 70 0.01 948665 27 48 59 134 0.01 
69 444861 11 28 37 76 0.02 468926 17 26 23 66 0.01 913787 28 54 60 142 0.02 
70+ 3831841 54 68 121 243 0.01 5809219 41 50 49 140 0.00 9641060 95 118 170 383 0.00 
Total  7253803 352 561 814 1727 0.02 9390065 631 952 770 2353 0.03 16643868 983 1513 1584 4080 0.02 
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Table 31 – Number of pensioners receiving full and partial pension (teilrente), as of 2005 
Men Women Men and women 
Full 
pension Partial pensions  
Full 
pension Partial pension  
Full 
pension Partial pension  
Age 
 1/3 1/2 2/3 Total 
% 
partial 
over 
full 
 1/3 1/2 2/3 Total 
% 
partial 
over 
full  
 1/3 1/2 2/3 Total % partial over full 
                   
60 61200 11 16 22 49 0.08 78590 22 31 34 87 0.11 139790 33 47 56 136 0.10
61 112698 19 30 46 95 0.08 145864 54 82 94 230 0.16 258562 73 112 140 325 0.13
62 143639 32 50 64 146 0.10 178881 53 88 94 235 0.13 322520 85 138 158 381 0.12
63 204830 68 88 122 278 0.14 238993 121 144 104 369 0.15 443823 189 232 226 647 0.15
64 322834 69 133 186 388 0.12 309508 134 236 161 531 0.17 632342 203 369 347 919 0.15
65 542990 32 53 98 183 0.03 541008 47 59 77 183 0.03 1083998 79 112 175 366 0.03
66 552601 27 46 56 129 0.02 557202 31 46 38 115 0.02 1109803 58 92 94 244 0.02
67 512728 16 16 42 74 0.01 520366 16 35 28 79 0.02 1033094 32 51 70 153 0.01
68 475687 16 23 32 71 0.01 488837 24 30 24 78 0.02 964524 40 53 56 149 0.02
69 455594 6 26 30 62 0.01 478567 19 23 23 65 0.01 934161 25 49 53 127 0.01
70+  4025392 64 89 153 306 0.01 5978764 52 74 66 192 0.00 10004156 116 163 219 498 0.00
Total  7410193 360 570 851 1781 0.02 9516580 573 848 743 2164 0.02 16926773 933 1418 1594 3945 0.02
 
Source: VDR – Statistick Rentenbestand, http://www.deutsche-rentenversicherung.de/ 
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